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Abstract
We develop a model of investment in duopoly with asymmetric costs
of innovating and imitating and endogenous ﬁrm roles. Dynamic com-
petition involves either attrition or preemption, the former being likelier
with high demand growth and uncertainty. Industry value is maximized
when ﬁrms neither stall nor hasten entry, and we show that social wel-
fare has local maxima in both the attrition and preemption ranges. In
all cases the socially optimal cost of imitation is positive. Attrition is
optimal if consumer surplus rises suﬃciently under duopoly, whereas with
static business-stealing, preemption is optimal if discounting is important
enough. Finally we discuss endogenous entry barriers and contracting,
ﬁnding that ﬁrms are more likely to rely on secrecy and patents at low
imitation costs and that simple licensing schemes are welfare improving.
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1 Introduction
Proﬁtable investment by a pioneering ﬁrm naturally breeds imitation by a subsequent
entrant. Developing an invention into a commercial product can require signiﬁcant
enough resources so that only a couple of ﬁrms may jockey to secure positions in an
industry either as a ﬁrst-mover or as a second entrant. In such circumstances product
development takes the form of a noncooperative timing game in which the nature of
competition and equilibrium outcomes are driven by the relative costs of innovation
and possible imitation.
We study the eﬀect of diﬀerences in the costs of innovating and imitating on
strategic investment decisions by developing a theoretical framework in which the
roles of ﬁrms, as innovators or imitators, are endogenous. How does such an ex-
post asymmetry in investment costs, together with the endogeneity of roles, aﬀect
the initial decisions of ex-ante identical ﬁrms? At which (relative) cost of imitation
is industry value maximized? From the standpoint of policy, how can intellectual
property (IP) rights modify the nature of competition and maximize social welfare in
the kinds of industries that we examine? Our paper sheds light on these questions
and highlights the role played by such industry characteristics as demand growth and
uncertainty.
One key set of conclusions that emerges is that with low demand growth and
volatility, as may arise in mature industries, a high degree of IP protection leading
to preemption is optimal. Moreover, in such industries it can be preferable to aﬀord
complete protection to innovators, so that strategic investment has the form of a
winner-take-all contest.
Conversely, attrition is more likely to arise, and low IP protection can constitute a
social optimum, when demand growth and volatility are high, a case that corresponds
precisely to the circumstances most commonly associated with innovative industries.
However costless imitation by a ﬁrm that succeeds in investing second is never socially
optimal, so an optimal attrition regime is necessarily winner-pay-some with a lower
bound on the cost of imitation that we are able to characterize.
1.1 Results
Our model leads to three sets of results. First, we characterize the eﬀect of varying
imitation cost on strategic competition. A low imitation cost leads to delayed prod-
uct introduction as ﬁrms seek to enter second, a situation of attrition. Conversely
a higher imitation cost is associated with accelerated product introduction, a case
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of preemption. Equilibrium in ﬁrm investments involves mostly standard preemp-
tion and attrition although the latter can also present a gap in the support of mixed
strategies. Preemption is more likely when product market competition is more in-
tense whereas attrition is more likely when discounting is less important, as occurs
when demand growth and volatility are high. Under both attrition and preemption,
positional rents are dissipated and we are able to identify the optimal relative imi-
tation cost for the industry, which is that cost of imitation at which there is neither
a race to preempt nor a war of attrition, i.e. at which ﬁrms do not compete for
positional rents by rushing or waiting unduly to innovate.
Next, we examine the welfare trade-oﬀs associated with raising imitation cost, as
may arise in the context of a regulator's choice of broader patent protection. There
is a positive lower bound for the optimal level of imitation cost, implying that free
imitation is always socially costly. The social welfare function generally has two local
maxima in the attrition and preemption range, either of which may constitute a global
maximum. We identify diﬀerent conditions on product market competition or demand
primitives for one form of dynamic competition or another to be optimal. Attrition is
optimal if a monopoly innovator practices ﬁrst-degree price discrimination or with a
suﬃciently elastic demand speciﬁcation, and preemption is optimal if there is product
market collusion under duopoly. If product market competition is characterized by a
business-stealing eﬀect, we derive a suﬃcient condition for preemption to be socially
optimal and show that with suﬃcient demand growth or volatility, the optimum is a
corner solution that results in a monopolized industry.
Finally, we discuss the extension of our model in a number of directions by incor-
porating a broader set of ﬁrm decisions. First we endogenize the cost of imitation
by allowing the innovator to make reverse engineering of its product more diﬃcult
or to pursue patent protection more aggressively. We ﬁnd that the lower the natural
cost of imitation, the greater the eﬀort exerted by innovators to raise entry barriers.
In addition, we allow for contracting between innovator and imitator that can take
the form either of a buyout or of a license agreement. With the former, attrition
may disappear entirely as an equilibrium if discounting is suﬃciently large. With the
latter, licensing increases welfare if the eﬃciency eﬀect is present, whereas if there
is suﬃcient product market complementarity the innovator may choose to privately
subsidize imitation.
1.2 Related literature
Our model of innovation and imitation builds upon a rich literature dating back
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to Reinganum [29] who provides a foundation for dynamic game-theoretic models of
duopoly adoption of a new technology. In a deterministic environment in which one of
the ﬁrms can commit as a ﬁrst investor, she identiﬁes a diﬀusion equilibrium in which
investments occur sequentially and result in a ﬁrst-mover advantage. Fudenberg and
Tirole [12] study investment decisions when leader and follower roles are endogenous.
In a preemption race, the ﬁrst investment occurs earlier than under diﬀusion, dissi-
pating rents to the ﬁrst investor so that ﬁrm values are equalized in equilibrium. In
a similar deterministic framework but with asymmetric ﬁrms, Katz and Shapiro [23]
allow for post-investment licensing or imitation and ﬁnd that a second-mover advan-
tage can arise so that investment decisions take the form either of a preemption race
or of a waiting game, although their focus is on asymmetric equilibria of the attri-
tion game. Subsequently, Hoppe [21] introduces uncertainty regarding the success of
new technology adoption into a similar model which leads to the possibility of both
preemption and attrition, although her focus is also on asymmetric equilibrium in
pure strategies rather than the type of symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium that we
characterize here.
Early research on the relative incentives of innovators and imitators addressed
the issues of optimal patent length and breadth, as in Gilbert and Shapiro [15] and
Gallini [14], whose notation we follow for the cost of inventing around. Denicolò
[8] discusses optimal patents in an innovation race that bears some similarities with
the model presented here, although his speciﬁcation does not allow for second-mover
advantage and attrition as we do, and we do not seek to characterize patent duration
but rather the optimal degree of IP protection. Our focus is on industries in which
ﬁrms are horizontal competitors rather than on the distribution of rents between
basic and applied research, whereas imitation has often been examined in the context
of cumulative innovation, notably by Green and Scotchmer [17] and Denicolò [9].
Some more recent work dealing with innovation and imitation such as Mukherjee
and Pennings [28] and Henry and Ruiz-Aliseda [20] identiﬁes the importance of the
patenting, licensing, and reverse engineering decisions that we examine, but do so
after innovation occurs with models in which one of the ﬁrms is an incumbent so that
their focus is on inherently asymmetric ﬁrms.
Because it takes demand to follow a stochastic dynamic process, real options the-
ory seems to us to provide the right framework within which to cast a discussion of
innovation incentives. A pioneering application of this type of strategic investment
model1 to patent races is that of Weeds [37], although she more closely describes
1Azevedo and Paxson [1] is a recent survey of this ﬁeld, which draws from game theory and
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the invention stage of innovation than the development or product introduction stage
that constitute our focus. We depart from existing work on strategic investment by
parsimoniously parametrizing ﬁrst- and second-mover advantage through the relative
ﬁxed costs of innovating and imitating ﬁrms and by characterizing a symmetric equi-
librium in Markovian strategies that lends itself to a novel welfare analysis. Huisman
[22] is a complementary contribution which studies the eﬀect of ex-post (rather than
ex-ante) ﬁrm asymmetry in a duopoly investment game. Research on innovation dy-
namics within this literature has addressed on informational spillovers, which are one
of the important determinants of second-mover advantage. For instance, Femminis
and Martini [11] model a disclosure lag of random duration before the follower ben-
eﬁts from a spillover. The eﬀect of informational spillovers on investment incentives
has also been studied in models of learning by Décamps and Mariotti [7] and Thi-
jssen et al. [34]. Through these diﬀerent contributions runs a common thread which
also forms a basis for our work: to the extent an innovator's investment has positive
spillovers for its rival, competition between otherwise symmetric ﬁrms takes the form
either of a preemption race or of a war of attrition. Thus an economic model of these
phenomena should in principle account for both types of cases.
1.3 An example: imitation cost in the biopharmaceutical industry
The questions we address were originally motivated by real-world situations in which
the same ﬁrms can face contrasting technological conditions with respect to ease of
imitation over the diﬀerent business segments in which they operate. In the biophar-
maceutical industry, typically, whereas medications are easily imitated thus justifying
the industry's systematic recourse to patent protection, in the vaccine segment tech-
nological conditions render imitation much more costly.2
On the one hand, pharmaceutical ﬁrms typically rely on intellectual property
rights in order to increase the costs of imitators for new drugs which otherwise could
be copied more easily than products whose production processes can be kept secret,
or for which the time and relative expense needed to copy the invention are much
continuous time ﬁnance in order to incorporate strategic and payoﬀ uncertainty into models of
investment. Typical applications are to capacity investment, as in Boyer et al. [4], as well as
investment in R&D, as in the present paper. For a thorough and pedagogical presentation, see also
Chevalier-Roignant and Trigeorgis [5].
2Another characteristic of the pharmaceutical industry is the uncertainty that is introduced by
late-stage clinical trials regarding the outcome of an R&D project, most often after signiﬁcant costs
have already been sunk, but we do not seek to represent this speciﬁc feature in our model.
4
higher (Scherer and Watal [31], p. 4). If such patent protection is not available, a
generic product can be introduced at a much lower ﬁxed cost than incurred by the
branded product supplier. In India, after the passage of the Patents Act 1970, and
before the TRIPs (Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property rights) agreements
were enforced, pharmaceutical products became unpatentable, allowing innovations
patented elsewhere to be freely copied (Lanjouw [24], p. 3). By reducing imitation
costs, the absence of legal protection fostered the domestic production of generic
formulations.
This ease of imitation is not found in the vaccine segment, as vaccines are made
from living micro-organisms, and unlike drugs are not easily reverse-engineered, as
the greatest challenges often lie in details of production processes that cannot be in-
ferred from the ﬁnal product, implying that there is technically no such thing as a
generic vaccine (Wilson [36], p. 13). The regulatory implication is that a me-too vac-
cine supplier must pay for clinical trials to demonstrate the safety and eﬃcacy of its
product. There is no short-cut toward the bio-equivalence of a copied candidate vac-
cine, whose design and delivery require investments in technological capabilities and
manufacturing facilities that comply with demanding regulatory standards. In the
case of recent complex vaccines (e.g., a tetravalent dengue virus vaccine), a follower
must catch up with leading-edge R&D and manufacturing approaches (the techno-
logical challenges for the design a dengue virus vaccine are reviewed in Guey Chuen
et al. [18]). The ﬁxed cost that must be incurred by a new entrant for the delivery of
a follow-on vaccine can thus be prohibitively high.3
2 A model of new product development
This section describes a model of strategic investment in line with the characteristic
features of innovation and imitation identiﬁed above. Assumptions regarding industry
structure and ﬁrm conduct are presented in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 and equilibrium is
characterized in Section 2.3.
2.1 Assumptions
Two identical ﬁrms seek to enter a market by introducing their version of a novel
product. Organizational constraints preclude a ﬁrm from selling two variants of the
product and technological or regulatory barriers shield both ﬁrms from further entry.
3We return to this example in light of the theoretical model in Section 4.1.
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Development of the new product occurs in the face of uncertainty regarding future
demand levels and involves irreversible investment as described by Dixit and Pindyck
[10].
The introduction of the product generates a baseline proﬁt ﬂow piM when a single
ﬁrm i is active and piD when both are. These values may reﬂect either standard
duopoly competition (0 < 2piD ≤ piM ) or competition with complementary product
diﬀerentiation (piM ≤ 2piD ≤ 2piM ). Flow proﬁt at time t is scaled by a multiplicative
component representing market size (Yt) so as to take the form piMYt or piDYt, and
this state variable is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion (dYt = αYtdt+
σYtdZt where (Zt)t≥0 is a standard Wiener process and α, σ ≥ 0) reﬂecting the idea
that demand for a new product evolves in a context of uncertainty. Proﬁt ﬂows
begin instantaneously and with certainty once investment has occurred. Firms have a
common and constant discount rate assumed to be large enough that the investment
problem is economically meaningful (r > α), and information is symmetric.
Introducing the new product involves an irrecuperable ﬁxed cost (I) for the the
ﬁrst ﬁrm that invests to serve demand, i.e. for the innovator. A ﬁrm that observes
its rival's innovation can invest afterwards (even immediately afterwards) as a second
entrant, i.e. as an imitator. We assume that in addition to the various standard
setup costs associated with bringing a product to market such as dedicated plant
and equipment, marketing expenditures, and so forth, the follower incurs a cost of
imitation of variable magnitude depending on technological or institutional factors.
Introducing the alternative version thus also involves an irrecuperable ﬁxed cost (K),
though we allow for the extreme case of costless imitation. The imitator's ﬁxed
cost may be either higher or lower than the innovator's, depending for instance on
the diﬃculty of reengineering and on the degree of IP protection aﬀorded to the
innovator. If the second ﬁrm can develop the same product independently, imitation
clearly should be no more expensive than innovation (K ≤ I) in the absence of
IP. When the product is complex enough or legal protection is suﬃciently strong,
imitators must invest in reverse engineering or invent around any patents held by the
innovator and the second mover incurs higher entry costs than the leader (K > I),4
4Our focus is the relation between innovation and imitation, but other circumstances can also lead
to asymmetric ﬁxed costs for ex-ante identical ﬁrms. If developing the new product involves scarce
assets, such as prime location in real estate or natural resource extraction, then the imitator may
face a higher cost (K > I). Also, imperfect competition in input markets may result in asymmetric
investment costs. In Billette de Villemeur et al. [2], investment cost is determined endogenously by a
strategic input supplier, resulting in a discounted input price for the ﬁrst ﬁrm that invests (I < K).
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and we allow for the possibility of an arbitrarily high imitation cost K∗ =∞.
2.2 Firm strategies and leader and follower payoﬀs
In order to focus on the economics of ﬁrm entry decisions, we model the entry pro-
cess as a game with Markovian strategies along the lines proposed by Thijssen [33]
that captures the relevant features of a more general game in stopping times. Firms
are thus assumed to choose investment thresholds which determine stochastic in-
vestment times. Thus the strategy of a ﬁrm i, i = 1, 2, consists of an initial en-
try threshold Yi ∈ R+ that, once reached for the ﬁrst time from below and absent
prior rival entry, triggers investment, and which is associated with a stopping time
τi := inf {t ≥ 0 |Yt ≥ Yi }. The choice of entry thresholds endogenously determines
the role of each ﬁrm as innovator or imitator. In the case of identical thresholds
(Y1 = Y2) when it would only be optimal for one of the ﬁrms to invest, a standard
coordination problem arises and a tie-breaking rule determines ﬁrm roles.
Industry dynamics may thus be viewed as resulting from a two stage interaction
which unfolds over time, where in a ﬁrst stage (which determines the onset of the
monopoly phase of the industry) the choices of initial entry thresholds (Y1, Y2) deter-
mine the roles of the ﬁrms, and in a second stage (the onset of the duopoly phase),
the remaining ﬁrm enters at a threshold of its choice. The latter continuation game is
a single-ﬁrm decision problem, and the remaining ﬁrm's follower threshold is denoted
by Y ∗F , Y
∗
F ≥ Yi, and associated with a stopping time τ∗F := inf {t ≥ 0 |Yt ≥ Y ∗F },
which is speciﬁed further below.
Given an initial level of the multiplicative shock Y0 = y the expected payoﬀs for
innovation and imitation at a threshold Yi are:
Ly (Yi, Y
∗
F ) = Ey
[∫ τ∗F
τi
e−rspiMYsds− e−rτiI +
∫ ∞
τ∗F
e−rspiDYsds
]
(1a)
=

piM
r−αy − I − piM−piDr−α Y ∗F
(
y
Y ∗F
)β
, Yi ≤ y(
piM
r−αYi − I
)(
y
Yi
)β
− piM−piDr−α Y ∗F
(
y
Y ∗F
)β
, Yi ≥ y
(innovator payoﬀ) (1b)
and
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Fy (Yi;K) = Ey
[∫ ∞
τi
e−rspiDYsds−Ke−rτi
]
(2a)
=

piD
r−αy −K , Yi ≤ y(
piD
r−αYi −K
)(
y
Yi
)β
, Yi ≥ y
(imitator payoﬀ), (2b)
where in both (1b) and (2b), β is shorthand for the function of parameters
β (α, σ, r) :=
1
2
− α
σ2
+
√(
1
2
− α
σ2
)2
+
2r
σ2
(3)
with β (α, 0, r) = limσ→0 β = r/α. The function β given in (3) is a standard expression
in real option models, satisfying β > 1. A lower value of β is associated with a
greater incentive to wait (it is straightforward to check that ∂β/∂α < 0, ∂β/∂σ < 0,
and ∂β/∂r > 0), so β may be interpreted as a measure of impatience. The (y/·)β
terms in which β occurs reﬂect the expected discounting of the monetary units that
are received when the stochastic process reaches the relevant thresholds for the ﬁrst
time.5 Here and throughout the rest of the paper L and F subscripts refer to leader
and follower.
Both ﬁrms may introduce their respective products independently at the same
moment, in which case they both incur the ﬁxed cost of innovation, I. The resulting
payoﬀ is My (Yi) := Ly (Yi, Yi) (= Fy (Yi; I)).
The leader (innovator) payoﬀ is composed of two terms, which correspond to the
monopoly proﬁt ﬂow of the innovating ﬁrm and the possible negative impact of the
second ﬁrm's entry.
Assuming the current level of the demand shock y is suﬃciently small so that it
is optimal for ﬁrms to delay investment (e.g. y ≤ (r − α) I/piM ) the payoﬀ func-
tions Ly, Fy and My are quasiconcave over the relevant parts of their domains
and attain non-negative maxima at YL := (β (r − α) I) / ((β − 1)piM ) and YF :=
(β (r − α)K) / ((β − 1)piD) and YS := (β (r − α) I) / ((β − 1)piD) respectively. We
refer to the thresholds YL and YF as the optimal standalone leader and follower thresh-
olds, and the pair of strategies {YL, YF } corresponds to the open loop equilibrium
5If σ = 0 the stopping time τi is deterministic and (Y0/Yi)β = e−rτi is the standard continuous
time discounting term under certainty.
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identiﬁed by Reinganum [29].6 A key property of the payoﬀ functions which is used
throughout our analysis is that the leader payoﬀ is nondecreasing in the imitation cost
provided the follower invests at the optimal follower threshold (∂Ly (Yi, Y
∗
F ) /∂K ≥ 0),
whereas the follower payoﬀ is decreasing in the imitation cost (∂Fy (Yi;K) /∂K < 0).
Note that there are two kinds of simultaneous investment outcomes that can arise
in the model. If one ﬁrm invests ﬁrst and thereby takes the role of innovator, but does
so at a suﬃciently high threshold (Yi ≥ YF ), the remaining ﬁrm then chooses to invest
immediately after, although it has the follower role and its payoﬀ is Fy (Yi;K). On
the other hand, if both ﬁrms happen to invest simultaneously without coordinating
their investments, they receive the same payoﬀ My (Yi).
Lastly then, it may occur that at a given threshold Yi both ﬁrms seek to invest
whereas it would only be optimal for one of them to do so. This happens if, let-
ting Y ∗F := max {Yi, YF } denote the optimal follower threshold conditional on a ﬁrst
investment at Yi, Fy (Y
∗
F ;K) > My (Yi). In this case we assume that either ﬁrm is
equally likely to invest as a leader or as a follower with probability
py (Yi;K) =

Fy(Y
∗
F ;K)−My(Yi)
Ly(Yi,Y ∗F )+Fy(Y ∗F ;K)−2My(Yi)
if Ly (Yi, Y
∗
F ) ≥ Fy (Y ∗F ;K)
0 if Ly (Yi, Y
∗
F ) < Fy (Y
∗
F ;K)
(4)
so accordingly 1− 2py (Yi;K) is the probability that mistaken simultaneous invest-
ment occurs.7
2.3 Equilibrium
We study the symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium of the entry game. One reason for
this is that as ﬁrms are taken to be symmetric ex-ante, it seems natural to suppose
that they hold symmetric beliefs about each other's play at the beginning of the
investment game. In so doing, the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 below is
6For suﬃciently low values of K (K ∈ [0,Kl) where Kl := (piD/piM )I), YF < YL. In this range,
if roles were exogenously assigned, a follower would be willing to pay its rival to induce it to invest
earlier. By deﬁnition the eﬀective follower investment threshold must be max {YL, YF }. We mention
this possibility for completeness but the value Kl does not play a signiﬁcant role in the rest of the
analysis.
7The tie-breaking rule (4) satisﬁes the rent-equalization property (Thijssen [33]). One contrast
between our model and a standard real option game is that the values of the leader and follower
payoﬀs generally diﬀer at YF because of the asymmetry in investment costs.
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consistent with the earlier approaches of Fudenberg and Tirole [12] and Hendricks et
al. [19].8 Another reason is that this equilibrium exhibits rent dissipation, a feature
that is emphasized in the early timing game literature as surveyed by Fudenberg and
Tirole [13], and which leads to a smooth dependence of equilibrium on imitation cost
that is of compelling simplicity.
As stated above the game described in Section 2.2 occurs in two eﬀective stages.
Firms ﬁrst compete in initial entry thresholds that endogenously determine their roles
as innovators or imitators, and subsequently any remaining ﬁrm selects its follower
entry threshold:
• Stage 1: both ﬁrms select initial entry thresholds (Y1, Y2) (or distribution
thereof) that determine innovator and imitator roles;
• Stage 2: if a single ﬁrm (i) innovates, the remaining ﬁrm (j) then selects its
imitator entry threshold.
To determine the equilibrium choices, note ﬁrst that once one of the ﬁrms has
invested, any ﬁrm that remains out of the market holds a standard growth option.
It prefers to wait if the ﬁrst investment has occurred early enough (before YF is
reached), and otherwise to invest immediately. Thus in the continuation game that
follows investment by ﬁrm j at a threshold Yj , the optimal policy of ﬁrm i 6= j is to
invest at a threshold Y ∗F = max {Yj , YF } which results in the optimal follower value
Fy (Y
∗
F ;K).
By backward induction a given ﬁrm i's initial payoﬀ is therefore
Vy (Yi, Yj) =

Ly (Yi, Y
∗
F ) if Yi < Yj
py (Yi;K)Ly (Yi, Y
∗
F ) + py (Yi;K)Fy (Y
∗
F ;K) + (1− 2py (Yi;K))My (Yi) if Yi = Yj
Fy (Y
∗
F ;K) if Yi > Yj
.
(5)
A pair of investment triggers (Y ∗1 , Y
∗
2 ) is a pure strategy Markov perfect equi-
librium of the duopoly investment game if for all y, Vy
(
Y ∗i , Y
∗
j
) ≥ Vy (Yi, Y ∗j ),
i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j.
8In games of attrition models, authors have sometimes proceeded diﬀerently. Notably, Hoppe [21]
focuses on asymmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. This applies if, for instance, the same entry
game is played in several independent markets and pre-play communication enables ﬁrm coordination,
but we do not allow for this possibility here.
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The following proposition establishes the existence a critical imitation cost, K̂,9
that determines the nature of the duopoly investment game. This imitation cost is
deﬁned implicitly by the condition that ﬁrms are indiﬀerent in equilibrium between
the innovator and imitator payoﬀs when these are evaluated at the optimal stan-
dalone thresholds, that is LYL (YL, YF ) = FYL
(
YF ; K̂
)
(note that YF is a function
of K). It is also useful for the proposition to deﬁne another critical imitation cost
level, K˜ ∈
(
0, K̂
)
, which is the solution to the condition LYL (YL, YF ) = MYL (YS).
Finally for K ≥ K̂ so that this is well-deﬁned, let YP denote the lower root of the
condition L (YP , YF ) = F (YF ;K). This threshold is usually referred to as the pre-
emption threshold, and here describes the point of indiﬀerence between innovating
and imitating.10
Proposition 1 The duopoly investment game has a unique symmetric Markov perfect
equilibrium characterized by a critical imitation cost K̂ ≤ I such that:
(i) If the imitation cost is low (K < K̂), ﬁrms play a game of attrition. There is an
equilibrium in mixed strategies with innovation triggers distributed continuously over
[YS ,∞) (if K ≤ K˜) or over a disconnected support of the form [YL, YS′ ] ∪ [YS ,∞)
(if K˜ < K < K̂). In the former case imitation occurs immediately after innovation,
otherwise it can occur later with positive probability at the imitation threshold YF .
(ii) If the imitation cost is intermediate (K = K̂), the equilibrium innovation triggers
are (YL, YL) and the innovation and imitation thresholds are YL and YF respectively.
(iii) If the imitation cost is high (K > K̂), ﬁrms play a game of preemption. The equi-
librium innovation triggers are (YP , YP ) and the innovation and imitation thresholds
are YP and YF respectively.
In order to illustrate the cases described in Proposition 1, Figures 1 − 5 depict
9See Section A.1 for a characterization of the critical values:
K̂ :=
(
(1 + β ((piM/piD)− 1)) / (piM/piD)β
)1/(β−1)
I,
and K˜ :=
(
β ((piM/piD)− 1) /
(
(piM/piD)
β − 1
))1/(β−1)
I.
10Note that simultaneous innovation almost never occurs in this model. In the attrition range,
setting identical stage 1 thresholds (Y˜1 = Y˜2) is a zero probability event, although if it ever were
to happen ﬁrms would invest simultaneously according to the tie-breaking rule. In the preemption
range, ﬁrms choose identical thresholds (Y ∗1 = Y
∗
2 = YP ) but coordinate so that either ﬁrm invests
as a leader with equiprobability.
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leader and follower payoﬀs in the ﬁrst stage of the game, for diﬀerent values of the
imitation cost and assuming y is not too large. Throughout these ﬁgures, as the
imitation cost increases, the optimal standalone follower threshold YF increases and
the follower payoﬀ shifts down and towards the right. Because of the longer monopoly
phase, the ﬁrst stage leader payoﬀ Ly (Yi, Y
∗
F ) accordingly shifts upward over the range
of thresholds (Y0, YF ) over which investments are sequential. Note that the optimal
standalone leader threshold YL is independent of K, and the leader payoﬀ function
has a kink at YF which constitutes the lower bound of the range of thresholds over
which innovator and imitator entry are simultaneous. In Figures 1 and 2, there is a
second-mover advantage (in the sense that Ly (YL, YF ) < Fy (YF ;K)) and the game
is one of attrition. Figure 3 represents the intermediate case in which the imitation
cost attains its critical value, K = K̂, and there is neither a ﬁrst-mover advantage nor
a second-mover advantage. In Figures 4 and 5, there is a ﬁrst-mover advantage (in
the sense that Ly (YL, YF ) > Fy (YF ;K)), and the game is one of preemption, with
the ﬁrst investment occurring at YP .
In the symmetric equilibrium described in Proposition 1, because the roles of
ﬁrms are endogenous, positive rent dissipation occurs whenever the ﬁrms play a game
of attrition (K < K̂) or of preemption (K > K̂). The expected value of ﬁrms in
equilibrium can therefore be characterized. To state the following corollary, some
further notation is necessary. Since Ly (Yi, Y
∗
F ) can have two local maxima, in cases
of attrition in which the imitation cost is suﬃciently low such as that illustrated in
Figure 1, its global maximum may be attained at YS := arg maxM (Yi), which then
corresponds to the lower bound of the support of innovator entry thresholds. Thus,
deﬁne Y ∗L := arg maxLy (Yi, Y
∗
F ) with Y
∗
L ∈ {YL, YS} to refer to the lower bound of
the appropriate attrition equilibrium threshold distribution.
Corollary 2 In a symmetric equilibrium the expected payoﬀs of ﬁrms EVy
(
Y˜ ∗1 , Y˜
∗
2
)
are identical and equal to min {Ly (Y ∗L , Y ∗F ) , Fy (YF ;K)}, that is (for Y0 low enough)
to the lowest of the diﬀusion equilibrium payoﬀs.
The dependence of the critical threshold imitation cost K̂ on model parameters
is straightforward. The next corollary gives sensitivity results with respect to the
intensity of competition in the product market (piM/piD) and discounting (β).
Corollary 3 The more intense product market competition is (piM/piD) and the more
ﬁrms discount the future (β), the more likely it is that preemption occurs, and con-
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versely for attrition:
∂K̂
∂ (piM/piD)
< 0 and
∂K̂
∂β
< 0. (6)
To provide intuition for this corollary, recall that the process Yt is stochastic and
that there is an option value for ﬁrms to wait before investing that is positively related
to volatility. Provided that there is an inherent advantage to imitation (K < I), for
some parameter values and in particular for large enough volatility (in which case
K < K̂), this option value outweighs any preemptive motive to secure monopoly
rents. A similar reasoning holds if the drift in demand is suﬃciently high. That is to
say, as ∂β/∂σ < 0 and ∂β/∂α < 0 by Corollary 3 an attrition regime is more likely in
industries with greater trend growth and demand volatility. This particular compar-
ative static is important because it provides a countervailing force to several of the
mechanisms that are discussed in the rest of the paper. As the next sections show,
institutional conditions such as IP protection and ﬁrm choices regarding both tech-
nology and licensing generally serve to make market entry regimes more preemptive
and attrition relatively rare. One would therefore expect attrition to be relatively
rare, except in industries signiﬁcant enough degree of demand growth or demand
uncertainty.
3 Imitation cost, industry proﬁt, and welfare
The previous section shows the central role played by the relative ﬁxed cost of imita-
tion in determining the nature of strategic competition and the equilibrium pattern
of entry in an industry, and ultimately the industry's levels of consumer surplus and
welfare. This imitation cost is likely to be driven by several diﬀerent factors including
technological conditions and the level of IP protection. It thus varies from industry
to industry and can be inﬂuenced ex-ante by regulators, typically through a choice
of patent breadth. These considerations raise the question of determining what may
be desirable levels of imitation cost. At ﬁrst glance this decision appears to involve
a simple trade-oﬀ since a higher imitation cost is socially wasteful but also hastens
innovator entry. However diﬀerent eﬀects arise with regard to imitator entry in the
preemption and attrition regimes that need to be examined more carefully.
For simplicity, throughout the discussion that follows we assume that regulators
act at a suﬃciently early stage of industry development to inﬂuence both innovation
and imitation decisions, i.e. that the initial demand state satisﬁes Y0 ≤ (r − α) I/piM ,
and drop the y subscripts on payoﬀ functions. In addition, let YI = min {Y ∗1 , Y ∗2 } de-
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note the threshold at which innovation occurs in equilibrium, which takes the random
value min
{
Y˜ ∗1 , Y˜
∗
2
}
, or YL or YP depending on the level of K as per Proposition 1.
3.1 Industry performance
A useful preliminary step to conducting a welfare analysis is to ﬁrst consider in-
dustry performance only, which allows us to derive an intermediate result regarding
industry value. We thus begin by studying the relationship between imitation cost,
ﬁrst- and second-mover advantage, and industry proﬁtability. A ﬁrst and seemingly
obvious consideration that emerges from our framework is that lower imitation cost
is a necessary, but not a suﬃcient condition for second mover advantage. Too see
why, note that if ﬁrms in an industry have identical ﬁxed costs there is an inher-
ent ﬁrst-mover advantage that results from the monopoly phase of the entry game
(L (YL, Y
∗
F ) ≥ F (Y ∗F ; I)). The degree of ﬁrst-mover advantage in this case is deter-
mined by the relative importance of monopoly proﬁt in the product market (piM/piD).
A second-mover advantage, on the other hand, arises through the input market when
the relative cost of imitation (K/I) is suﬃciently low to compensate for foregoing the
period of monopoly proﬁt. Thus the empirical presence of lower costs for imitators, as
has been observed by diﬀerent authors (Mansﬁeld et al. [27], Samuelson and Scotch-
mer [30]), does not by itself ensure that ﬁrms will ﬁnd it desirable to pursue so-called
imitation strategies in a dynamic setting.
Next, in the symmetric equilibrium of our model, there is a monotone relationship
between imitation cost and innovation thresholds, as well between imitation cost
and imitation lags, as follows. First, the higher is the imitation cost, the higher is
the standalone threshold for the follower ﬁrm (YF ), although actual follower entry
may occur either at this threshold or possibly later if the investment game is one of
attrition. The eﬀect of the resulting delay in follower entry on the innovation threshold
YI is similar throughout the range of imitation costs. As imitation cost increases, in
the attrition regime it is the distribution of innovator entry thresholds (Y˜I) that is
shifted leftward whereas in the preemption regime rent equalization directly results in
a lower preemption threshold (YP ). However, the eﬀect of higher imitation cost on the
distribution of follower investment (imitation) thresholds (Y ∗F ) is not itself monotone
in K in every regime. Under attrition, imitator entry occurs at a higher threshold as
a result of an increase in imitation cost conditionally upon the innovation threshold
realization being low enough (if Y˜I ≤ YF ), but the imitator entry threshold is random
otherwise and its distribution is shifted leftward if the innovator enters late (if Y˜I >
YF ). Nevertheless, the gap (and therefore the expected time lag) between innovation
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and imitation thresholds, Y ∗F
(
Y˜I
)
− Y˜I , can be shown to increase stochastically with
imitation cost. To summarize, higher imitation cost may properly be said to accelerate
innovative investment and to delay the arrival of imitative investment conditional
upon innovation having occurred.
Lastly, the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1 leads to a particularly simple
result regarding industry performance. Because in the diﬀerent regimes of attrition
and preemption, competition between ﬁrms to secure either second- or ﬁrst-mover
advantages results in the dissipation of any positional rents and since leader value
increases in imitation cost whereas follower value decreases, it is only when the level
of the imitation cost is such that neither of these regimes occurs (case (ii), K = K̂)
that investment thresholds are set optimally from the standpoint of industry proﬁt.
Thus all else equal, it is in those industries in which imitation cost reaches the level
where ﬁrms do not have an incentive to seek positional advantages of either sort that
industry value is maximized.
Proposition 4 Viewed as a function of imitation cost, expected industry value is
single-peaked, constant over
(
0, K˜
)
, and attains its maximum when neither attrition
nor preemption occur (at K = K̂).
According to Proposition 4 there exists a range over which expected ﬁrm value
EV
(
Y˜ ∗1 , Y˜
∗
2
)
= M(YS) is unaﬀected by imitation cost. But there is also a range of
imitation cost levels
(
K˜, K̂
)
over which greater resource costs are strictly beneﬁcial
to the industry. That is to say, if ﬁxed costs are suﬃciently high to shield an innovator
from instantaneous imitation with positive probability, product introduction is more
timely and both ﬁrms beneﬁt ex-ante. In addition, Proposition 4 is also instrumental
in establishing our main welfare results, Proposition 5 and Proposition 7 below.
3.2 Optimal protection of innovation
We take the view that regulators can inﬂuence the relative cost of imitation (at least
upward) through a choice of IP protection level that we interpret as patent breadth.
With this single instrument and provided that the natural imitation cost is not so
high as to bind the regulator, the imitation cost K may be considered to be a decision
variable. We consider a second-best welfare benchmark in which ﬁrms are free to select
their entry thresholds and product market output or prices.
To provide some intuition for the analysis that follows, expected welfare in this
model can be broken down into three parts: expected industry value, consumer surplus
15
from innovator entry, and consumer surplus from imitator entry. The ﬁrst of these is
maximized at the critical imitation cost K̂ (Proposition 4) whereas the other two parts
both depend onK directly as well as indirectly through the equilibrium innovation and
imitation thresholds. A higher imitation cost unambiguously accelerates innovator
entry which raises consumer surplus, so the second of these welfare components is
clearly increasing in K. But in the case of an attrition regime, the impact of imitation
cost on the last of the three components of welfare is more complex, since an increase
in K may either delay imitator entry (through its eﬀect on the standalone threshold
YF at which imitation occurs with positive probability) or hasten it (if the innovation
threshold realization is greater than YF so that imitation is immediate). Conceivably
then, even though raising imitation cost from a suﬃciently low initial level K <
K̂ increases industry proﬁt and the consumer surplus from innovation, an attrition
outcome may still be socially desirable if the loss of consumer surplus resulting from
delayed imitation is large enough.
To formalize these insights, suppose that consumer surplus is scaled by the market
size parameter Yt, as is the case for ﬁrm proﬁts. Let CSM and CSD then denote the
unit ﬂows of consumer surplus under monopoly and under duopoly respectively. The
social discount rate is assumed to be identical to that of ﬁrms. Recall from Proposition
3 that equilibrium innovative investment threshold YI is stochastic in an attrition
regime, and that the distributions of the threshold of both innovative investment and
follower investment (Y ∗F ) are functions of K. Expected social welfare is
W (K) = E
2V (Y˜ ∗1 , Y˜ ∗2 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
industry value
+
CSM
r − α
[
Y˜I
]−(β−1)
Y β0︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumer surplus from innovation
+
(CSD − CSM )
r − α [Y
∗
F ]
−(β−1)
Y β0︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumer surplus from imitation
 .
(7)
The ﬁrst summand in (7) is the industry's expected value. By Proposition 4
it is equal to 2 min {L (Y ∗L , Y ∗F ) , F (Y ∗F ;K)}, which is single-peaked with respect to
K with a maximum at K̂. The second term is the consumer surplus that results
from innovative investment. The expected value of this term increases with K, since
a higher imitation cost shifts the distribution of innovator entry thresholds (which
may be degenerate, e.g. under preemption) leftward. The third term is the consumer
surplus that results from the imitator's entry into the market. The eﬀect of increasing
K on this term is ambiguous, as it encompasses the two opposing eﬀects discussed
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above. Nevertheless, the eﬀect of raising imitation cost on welfare can be partially
characterized as follows (see Section A.4 for a proof, the main steps of which are
outlined below).
First, within the range of preemption regimes (K > K̂) the innovator and imitator
entry thresholds are respectively YP and YF and the local optimum of (7), KP , has
an explicit form. For a range of parameter values β ∈ [β0,∞), β0 > 1, this optimum
is a corner solution (KP = ∞) signifying that the social planner's imitation cost
instrument is of too limited a reach to attain its welfare objective. Put another way,
for suﬃciently large β the optimal form of preemption is a winner-take-all contest.
Since the greatest amount of preemption that the social planner can induce does not
generate enough competition to induce ﬁrms to enter suﬃciently early in such cases,
a single ﬁrm is active ex-post whose investment threshold is determined by the threat
of potential entry. On the other hand, if discounting is not too strong so β ∈ (1, β0)
as occurs for instance if volatility is large, KP is ﬁnite and strictly greater than K̂ so
long as consumer surplus under monopoly is positive (CSM > 0).
Second, within the range of attrition regimes, there can be another local maximum
of welfare. To establish its existence, because (7) is continuous, it is suﬃcient to show
that social welfare is decreasing to the left of the critical value K̂. To see why this
may occur set CSM = 0 for simplicity so that the middle term in (7) drops out. Also,
note that the expected industry value term E2V
(
Y˜1, Y˜2
)
reaches a maximum at K̂
so ∂EV
(
Y˜1, Y˜2
)
/∂K
∣∣∣
K̂
= 0. Then the behavior of social welfare to the left of K̂ is
determined by the remaining consumer surplus from imitation (CSD−CSM ) term. In
an attrition regime and for values of K near K̂ (for K ∈
(
K˜, K̂
)
) this term has two
distinct parts depending on whether the innovator investment threshold realization is
below Y ′S (in which case imitator investment occurs at YF , see Figure 2) or above (in
which case imitation immediately follows innovation). Accounting for the equilibrium
distribution of Y ∗F therefore gives this term as
(CSD − CSM )
r − α [YF ]
−(β−1)
Y β0
(
G∧ (YS ;K) +
∫ ∞
YS
(YF /s)
β−1
dG∧(s;K)
)
(8)
where G∧ (·;K) denotes the distribution of Y˜I . However, we have G∧
(
YS ; K̂
)
= 1
and ∂G∧
(
YS ; K̂
)
/∂K = 0. To the left of the critical value K̂ therefore, changes in K
have a second-order eﬀect on the distribution of entry thresholds compared with their
17
eﬀect on YF . Thus an envelope argument on the welfare expression (7) establishes
that limK̂− ∂W (K) /∂K < 0.
Finally, either type of local maximum (under attrition or preemption) can be
a global maximum, depending on the relative magnitude of the consumer surplus
resulting from innovation and from imitation.
Proposition 5 In a constrained social optimum
(i) either attrition or preemption may be optimal;
(ii) if the optimum involves attrition, the imitator incurs a positive cost K∗ > K˜
(winner-pay-some);
(iii) if the optimum involves preemption, innovation occurs at the threshold Y ∗P =
ψYL, ψ ∈ [(β − 1) /β, 1]; for β large enough, a perpetual monopoly (winner-take-all)
is optimal.11
The upshot of Proposition 5 is that there is no one size ﬁts all prescription with
respect to balancing the incentives of innovating and imitating ﬁrms, suggesting that
policy is best determined on a case by case basis according to a number of industry
conditions. Nevertheless, the proposition is informative in a number of ways.
To begin with, part (i) is of particular importance insofar as some prominent
researchers have argued for the abolition of patents altogether (Boldrin and Levine
[3]). Our model points to the fact that such an abolition may be desirable only to the
extent that the natural cost of imitation is suﬃciently high, i.e. K ≥ K˜. Moreover,
this lower bound on imitation cost has an intuitive characterization, in that industry
conditions must be such that an innovator has some positive ex-ante probability of
earning a monopoly proﬁt, rather than the certainty of facing immediate imitation
(even if imitation results in a positive duopoly rent).
In the following corollary, two polar cases provide further economic intuition for
part (i) of the proposition.
Corollary 6 In a constrained social optimum
11See Section A.4 for a characterization of ψ := max
{
β−1
β
,
(
CSD−CSM
piD
+ 2
β
)
/
(
CSD
piD
− β−1
β
CSM
piM
+ 2
β
)}
.
It bears mention that in the literature, preemption thresholds generally do not have analytic ex-
pressions.
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(i) if there is perfect price discrimination under monopoly (CSM = 0), attrition is
socially optimal;
(ii) if there is either a unit demand or collusion in the product market (CSD + 2piD =
CSM + piM ), preemption is socially optimal.
While the optimal value of welfare in the preemption range has a closed form
expression, the characterization of the optimal value of welfare in the attrition range
is more complex. We therefore make a further restriction and suppose that the static
entry incentive is socially excessive (piD ≥ (CSD + 2piD) − (CSM + piM )) in order to
obtain our next welfare proposition. To provide a rationale for this restriction, re-
call that in a static setting with symmetric ﬁrms and homogeneous goods, Mankiw
and Whinston [25] show that there is excess entry in an industry if total output
increases whereas individual outputs decrease in the number of ﬁrms (the business-
stealing eﬀect) and argue that these assumptions characterize a broad range of models
of oligopoly. In our dynamic setting, this assumption allows us to bound the wel-
fare associated with the imitator's entry, E( (CSD − CSM ) /(r − α))Y ∗F (Y0/Y ∗F )β , by
the expected value of a duopoly ﬁrm, and hence by E V (YL, YL)|K=K̂ (according to
Proposition 4), so as to establish the following.
Proposition 7 Suppose that the static private entry incentive is socially excessive.
Then, in a constrained social optimum preemption is optimal if12
CSM
piM
≥ Ω (β) . (9)
The right-hand term is decreasing in β with lim∞ Ω (β) = 0, the condition (9) is
satisﬁed for a given demand speciﬁcation if there is suﬃcient discounting, as occurs
if industry growth and volatility are suﬃciently low.
We conclude this section by illustrating with the case of a common oligopoly
speciﬁcation.
Example 8 Suppose that the product market is characterized by a constant elasticity
inverse demand P = AQ−η, A > 0 and η ∈ (0, 1), and that ﬁrms have constant unit
variable cost c. Then straightfoward calculations establish
CSM
piM
=
1
1− η and
CSD
CSM
= 2
(
1 +
1
1− η
) 1
η−1
. (10)
12See Section A.5 for a derivation of Ω (β) := 2/
((
ββ/ (β − 1)β−1
)
− β
)
.
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Therefore, limη→0 (CSD/CSM ) = ∞ and limη→1 (CSM/piM ) = ∞ so that by Corol-
lary 6 and Proposition 7, the second-best social optimum involves attrition if demand
is suﬃciently elastic and preemption if demand elasticity approaches unity.
4 Endogenous entry barrier, buyout, and licensing
In this section, we discuss how further real-world aspects of innovation and imitation
may be incorporated into the framework of the previous sections. One is the ability of
an innovating ﬁrm to raise the entry barrier of the imitator, either through technolog-
ical choices in product development that render reverse engineering more costly or by
strengthening the patentability of its product. Another aspect is contracting between
the innovator and the imitator, which typically takes the form of technology transfer
that reduces the follower's imitation cost in a context similar to a licensing agree-
ment, but can also involve a pay for delay agreement or a buyout. From a formal
standpoint these extensions both add an intermediate stage to the investment game,
once the innovator's entry has occurred and before the imitator invests. Moreover,
by raising the standalone value of the innovating ﬁrm, they tend to favor ﬁrst-mover
advantage and the emergence of preemption regimes although the implications for
imitation timing and welfare generally diﬀer.
4.1 Endogenous entry barrier
Suppose that the innovating ﬁrm may rely on a varying degree of either legal or
technical protection in order to inﬂuence the imitation cost of a subsequent entrant.
In case of legal protection, the imitation cost level reﬂects the breadth of patents,
with wider patents implying higher costs for inventing around so as to develop a non-
infringing imitation. Moreover, ﬁrms may decide to pursue patent protection more or
less aggressively, as is the case for pharmaceutical ﬁrms as discussed in Section 1.3. In
case of technical protection, the imitation costs are imparted by reverse engineering,
and increase with the complexity of the copied product. For instance, an innovating
ﬁrm can expend eﬀort to render its product more diﬃcult to disassemble, or even add
misleading complexity (Samuelson and Scotchmer [30]).
Such choices may be incorporated into our model by introducing a decision by the
innovating ﬁrm at the time of its investment to expend an additional irrecuperable
cost, which we denote by ρ, that raises the imitating ﬁrm's ﬁxed cost by an amount
f (ρ), where f is taken to be an increasing and weakly concave function, with f(0) = 0
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for simplicity. The cost ρ is deducted from the innovator payoﬀ L (Yi, Y
∗
F ) deﬁned
in (1a). The investment costs of the innovator and imitator are then redeﬁned as
I (ρ) := I0 + ρ and K (ρ) := K0 + f (ρ), where I0 and K0 represent baseline values
where no eﬀort is exerted on raising rival cost. With respect to the sequence of
decisions, the choice of ρ arises once the roles of ﬁrms are determined, at the moment
the innovator enters and before the second ﬁrm's entry so that we have:
• Stage 1': both ﬁrms select initial entry thresholds (Y1, Y2) that determine inno-
vator and imitator roles;
• Stage 2': if a single ﬁrm (i) innovates, it selects a degree of patenting eﬀort and
product complexity (ρ);
• Stage 3': the remaining ﬁrm (j) then selects its imitator entry threshold.
Proceeding by backward induction, in stage 3' the imitator payoﬀ is a nonin-
creasing function of K(ρ) and therefore of the innovator's eﬀort ρ whereas its entry
threshold Y ∗F (ρ) = max {Yi, YF (ρ)} is nondecreasing. In stage 2', with an endogenous
barrier to imitation an innovator that enters at Yi has an adapted expected payoﬀ
Le (Yi, ρ) and faces the decision problem maxρ Le (Yi, ρ), and at an interior optimum
the cost-raising eﬀort satisﬁes
f ′ (ρ∗)
(K0 + f (ρ∗))
β
=
ββ−1
(β − 1)β
piD
piM − piD
(
r − α
piD
)β
Y −βi . (11)
The reasoning for stage 1' proceeds as in the model of Section 2, save that the innova-
tion and imitation payoﬀs take the respective forms Le (Yi, ρ) and F (Y
∗
F (ρ
∗) ;K0 + f (ρ∗)).
Whenever it is interior (positive) the optimal choice ρ∗ results in a higher innova-
tor payoﬀ, whereas the imitator payoﬀ is lower: (Le (Yi, ρ
∗) > L (Yi, Y ∗F (0)) and
F (Yi;K0 + f (ρ
∗)) < F (Yi;K0)). The equilibrium is as characterized in Proposition
1, the main diﬀerences being that the endogenization of K results in more preemptive
strategic investment with a lower critical threshold K̂e < K̂ separating the preemption
and attrition regimes.
The endogeneity of entry barriers has some noteworthy economic consequences.
To begin with, in those industries in which the cost of imitation is large enough so that
entry competition is in the preemption range, as equilibrium payoﬀs are decreasing
in imitation cost (Proposition 4), ﬁrms have a lower expected value than when the
imitation cost is exogenous. To avoid this penalizing outcome ﬁrms would prefer to
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both commit ex ante not to exert any cost-raising eﬀort in case they happen to lead
the investment process as an outcome of stage 1' (since ex post, raising the imitation
cost is a dominant strategy for the ﬁrm that happens to enter as an innovator in stage
2'). One way to achieve such a commitment is by agreeing to a common and open
technological standard.
Moreover, the ﬁrst-order condition of the innovator is informative as to the role
of the baseline cost of imitation K0. Since the left-hand side of (11) is a decreasing
function that shifts downward as K0 increases, a straightforward comparative static
establishes that the eﬀort to raise the level of entry barriers decreases with the base-
line imitation cost, which it supplements (∂ρ∗/∂K0 < 0). The latter property is in
line with the biopharmaceutical industry case discussed in Section 1.3 where ﬁrms
typically place greater reliance on patenting in the medications segment, in which
natural entry barriers are low, than in the vaccines segment.
Thus,
Proposition 9 In an extended framework for strategic investment, with endogenous
barriers to imitator entry, in a preemption regime ﬁrms beneﬁt from agreeing ex-ante
to a common standard; the lower the baseline cost of imitation, the higher the entry
barrier set by the innovator.
4.2 Buyout and licensing
The autonomous investment incentives of innovators and imitators having been de-
scribed, it is then natural to allow for some common forms of contracting between
ﬁrms. In the context of innovation and imitation, licensing is a particularly impor-
tant possibility whenever some of the knowledge developed by the innovator can be
transferred to the second ﬁrm. Other types of contracts that can be observed include
a pay-for-delay agreement or a buyout, if these are allowed and provided that an
imitator can commit not to enter the market over a certain period. Such agreements
are typically concluded by pharmaceutical ﬁrms and generic manufacturers. In this
context, a buyout in which the acquiring ﬁrm shuts down its rival may be thought of
as a limiting case of pay-for-delay.
In order to focus broadly on the eﬀects of contracting on entry timing, we make the
simplifying assumption that ﬁrms have the ability to make a single spot transaction,
which may involve a transfer either of technology or asset ownership in exchange for
a lump sum payment. This simple form of contract suﬃces to illustrate a diversity of
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outcomes. We also assume that the contract is written by the innovator, who holds
all the bargaining power.
As a result, the entry game has an intermediate stage, which consists of a dynamic
agency problem in which the innovator incentivizes the imitating ﬁrm's investment
behavior. LetK0 denote an incompressible level of imitation cost reﬂecting such items
as distribution and marketing expenses, and KI denote that part of the imitator's
product development cost that can be eliminated by a technology transfer from the
innovator, so the ﬁxed cost of the imitator is K := K0 +KI . The sequence of moves
is:
• Stage 1: both ﬁrms select initial entry thresholds (Y1, Y2) that determine inno-
vator and imitator roles;
• Stage 2: if a single ﬁrm (i) innovates, it proposes a contract involving a transfer
(ϕ) from the innovator to the imitator (ϕ > 0 for a pay for delay or buyout,
ϕ < 0 for a technology transfer);
• Stage 3: the remaining ﬁrm (j) decides whether or not to accept the contract
and selects its entry threshold.
The reservation value of the follower if it rejects any contract with the innovator
is the value which results from the equilibrium described in the model of Section 2,
F (Y ∗F ;K0 +KI). Because this reservation value is time-dependent until its realization
at Stage 3, it is useful to denote its Stage 2 value as F0 (Yt) and we assume without
loss of generality that the contract is proposed at the time either the innovator or the
imitator enters, i.e. Yt = Yi or Yt = Y
∗
F . There are then two cases to consider that
depend on the comparative industry proﬁts in monopoly and duopoly.
(i) When the eﬃciency eﬀect is present (piM/piD ≥ 2) as occurs in many standard
industrial organization settings, if it can do so eﬀectively an innovator prefers to pay
the imitator its reservation value at the time of its entry (ϕ∗ = F0 (Yi)) in order
to delay imitation indeﬁnitely (a buyout). Such an arrangement raises the expected
payoﬀ function of the leader and leaves the expected payoﬀ of the follower unchanged,
rendering a preemption regime more likely. All else equal, the magnitude of the impact
on leader payoﬀ depends on the strength of the eﬃciency eﬀect, and if it is suﬃciently
strong or volatility is high enough (if piM/piD ≥ β+1) attrition does not occur for any
level of K. If K ≥ K̂ so that the industry is in a preemption regime, then industry
proﬁts are pegged at F0 (YF ) and unaﬀected by the possibility of buyout, whereas
they are weakly higher otherwise. The eﬀect on consumer surplus is ambiguous, as
innovation occurs earlier than it otherwise would but this must be balanced against
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the absence of imitator entry into the product market. Taking two extreme examples,
with perfect price discrimination under monopoly (CSM = 0) a takeover may or may
not be socially eﬃcient depending on the relative importance of additional innovator
value and lost surplus from imitation, whereas if the product market would function as
a cartel (piM/piD = 2) a buyout increases welfare only to the extent that it economizes
on the ﬁxed cost of imitation, K.
If a takeover is not allowed the best option for the innovator is to allow follower
entry at the standard threshold Y ∗F , but set its maximum license fee at this moment
ϕ∗ = KI so as to recoup revenue from a part of the imitator's investment cost, thus re-
ducing the duplication of R&D eﬀorts. At the time of innovator entry, the discounted
expected value of this fee reduces the innovator's irreversible cost of investment by
the expected licensing revenue KI(Yi/Y
∗
F )
β and the leader payoﬀ in stage 1 shifts up
for an unchanged payoﬀ function to the imitator, as in the case of a takeover. As with
a buyout, a consequence of licensing is a lower critical imitation cost that separates
the preemption and attrition regimes and a weakly increasing industry value. With
licensing, the eﬀect on consumer surplus is simpler. Licensing accelerates innovation
under both preemption and attrition, leaving the arrival of imitation unchanged at
YF , and is therefore unambiguously welfare improving.
(ii) If there is suﬃcient product market complementarity between ﬁrms (piM/piD <
2), imitation is a positive externality for the industry. The optimal imitator entry
threshold for the industry is then Y ∗∗F := β (r − α)K0/ (β − 1) (2piD − piM ). It is
greater than the standalone imitator threshold if the value of transferable technology
is relatively small or if product complementarity is not too strong (if piM/piD >
2 − (K0/ (K0 +KI))) and smaller otherwise, in which case an innovator seeks to
accelerate imitator entry. If it enters early enough to have leeway and imitation
would occur too late otherwise (Yi, Y
∗∗
F < YF ), the innovator induces the industry
optimum by setting a license fee
ϕ∗ =
piD
r − αY
∗∗
F −K0 − F0 (Y ∗∗F ) (12)
and we ﬁnd ϕ∗ < KI in this case. This result is noteworthy because the innovator
then subsidizes the licensee to induce imitation at Y ∗∗F .
13 Returning to the biophar-
maceutical example discussed throughout the paper, this result oﬀers a rationalization
13The use of this simple licensing instrument increases welfare since innovation and imitation occur
earlier while industry proﬁt does not decrease, but this result is not robust to other forms of licensing.
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for observed cooperation in the vaccine industry, when a research-intensive manufac-
turer transfers knowledge to a local competitor in a developing economy for a lesser
payment than the investment that the technology recipient would have made in the
absence of agreement (see WHO [38]).
Thus,
Proposition 10 In an extended framework for strategic investment, with contracting
between the innovator and the imitator, (i) if the eﬃciency eﬀect is suﬃciently strong
industry proﬁts increase with buyouts and only preemption occurs, whereas when buy-
outs are ruled out licensing is proﬁtable and increases welfare; (ii) if there are signif-
icant product market complementarities and imitation occurs late, the innovator may
choose to subsidize its rival's entry in a licensing agreement.
5 Conclusion
We have sought to develop an integrative framework to study some general questions
regarding the allocation of resources to innovation and to imitation under imperfect
competition. The analysis of the trade-oﬀ between static and dynamic ineﬃciency
under imperfect competition highlights a novel channel through which the relative
cost of imitation inﬂuences welfare, insofar as it impacts the timing of innovation
and may even alter the nature of strategic competition (attrition vs. preemption).
The broad message that emerges from our analysis remains a familiar one if demand
growth and volatility are low enough, as typically occurs in mature industries. In this
case, suﬃcient barriers to imitation should exist so that dynamic competition between
ﬁrms is preemptive in nature, and if discounting is suﬃcient, it should take the form
of a winner-take-all contest. But in those industries in which growth and volatility
are suﬃciently high, and which are those which are most typically associated with
innovation, a form of limited attrition may be optimal in order for the beneﬁts of
imitation not to arrive too late. In that case the winner of the attrition game must
pay some, in the form of a positive imitation cost, which may not be so high as to
render dynamic competition preemptive.
The theoretical model thus points towards a policy prescription that consists in
tailoring IP protection to such general industry or market segment characteristics, as
If Y ∗∗F > YF and the innovator can sign a forcing contract that is contingent on the imitator's entry
threshold, imitation is optimally delayed by licensing and the consequences for welfare are ambiguous.
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may suggest whether the greater risk lies in the direction of insuﬃcient natural inno-
vation incentives and attrition on the one hand, or an excessive preemption and delay
in perceiving the beneﬁts of imitation on the other. As described in our introduc-
tory example, biopharmaceutical ﬁrms must adapt their strategies to the contrasting
technological conditions that they face in their medication and vaccine segments. In
this particular industry moreover, signiﬁcant steps have already been taken in order
to adjust IP protection in response to identiﬁable categories of market conditions,
in accordance with our policy conclusion. For orphan drugs and rare disease devel-
opment, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration has enacted an enhanced form of
IP protection (Orphan Drug Exclusivity) together with a tax credit that lowers the
costs of clinical trials (Grabowski et al. [16]). Our analysis oﬀers theoretical support
to regulatory measures of this kind that adapt the relative cost of innovation and
imitation to a market's speciﬁc characteristics, and which could also involve patent
narrowing in case of high demand growth and volatility.
Among the extensions of our model that might be pursued, another step in the
analysis would be to study incremental innovation (or versioning) among existing
ﬁrms in a market. In this setting, it is possible that simultaneous investment equi-
librium solutions arise, suggesting that ﬁrms might coordinate on investment timing,
and it is not much further to go to examine the possibility of cooperation in product
development with these tools as well.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
In this section we ﬁrst identify and characterize the critical threshold K̂. We then
study the innovator value function Ly (Yi, Y
∗
F ). Finally, we derive the equilibrium
strategies in the attrition (K < K̂) and preemption regimes (K ≥ K̂).
Characterization of K̂
Proposition 11 There exists a unique threshold that separates the attrition and pre-
emption regimes of the investment timing game,
K̂ =
(
1 + β ((piM/piD)− 1)
(piM/piD)
β
)1/(β−1)
I. (13)
We ﬁrst verify that K̂ is well deﬁned. If K = 0, then YF = 0 so the follower's
investment in stage 2 occurs immediately after innovation, Y ∗F = Yi. In that case
Ly (Yi, Y
∗
F ) =
(
piD
r − αYi − I
)(
y
Yi
)β
<
piD
r − αYi
(
y
Yi
)β
= Fy (Y
∗
F ; 0) (14)
for all Yi ≥ y. For any K, any increase in imitation cost shifts Ly (Yi, Y ∗F ) up-
ward since Y ∗F is nondecreasing in K and ∂Ly (Yi, Y
∗
F ) /∂Y
∗
F ≥ 0. Moreover any
increase in imitation cost shifts Fy (Y
∗
F ;K) downward since Y
∗
F maximizes Fy (Yi;K)
and ∂Fy (Yi;K) /∂K < 0. At YL and YF therefore, ∂Ly (YL, Y
∗
F ) /∂K ≥ 0 and
∂Fy (Y
∗
F ;K) /∂K < 0, with limK→∞ Fy (Y
∗
F ;K) = 0. Therefore, there exists a unique
level of the imitation cost K̂ such that Ly (Y
∗
L , Y
∗
F ) = Fy
(
Y ∗F ; K̂
)
, y ≤ YL. As
Ly (YS , YS) = Fy (Y
∗
F ;K) ⇔ K = I in which case Ly (YL, Y ∗F ) > Fy (Y ∗F ; I), this
threshold is given by the solution in K to LYL (YL, YF ) = FYL (YF ;K), and it is di-
rect to verify the expression (13), as well as the property discussed Section 3.1 of the
text, K̂ ≤ I (see Section A.8.1 in the supplementary section for derivations).
Characterization of Ly (Yi, Y
∗
F )
We next study the function Ly (Yi, Y
∗
F ) for y suﬃciently low that ﬁrms initially
delay investment. There are at most two local maxima, at YL = arg maxLy (Yi, YF )
and YS = arg max My (Yi), with YL ≤ YS . For K = 0, YF < YL so Y ∗F = min {Yi, YF }
and Ly (Yi, Y
∗
F ) < My (YS). As argued above, any increase in imitation cost shifts
Ly (Yi, Y
∗
F ) upward, whereas My (YS) is unchanged. Therefore, there exists a unique
level of the imitation cost K˜ such that Ly (YL, Y
∗
F ) = My (YS). This threshold is given
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by the solution in K to Ly (YL, YF ) = My (YS), and it is direct to verify that
K˜ =
(
β ((piM/piD)− 1)
(piM/piD)
β − 1
)1/(β−1)
I. (15)
Then YL (resp. YS) is a unique global maximum of Ly (Yi, Y
∗
F ) if K > K˜ (resp.
K < K˜).
Recall that Kl := (piD/piM ) I denotes the imitation cost such that YL = YF . Then
the critical imitation cost levels that determine diﬀerent equilibrium properties in the
attrition range are ranked as follows:
Proposition 12 The imitation cost levels
{
Kl, K˜, K̂
}
satisfy Kl ≤ K˜ ≤ K̂ with
strict inequalities if piM > piD.
(see Section A.8.1 for derivation).
Attrition equilibrium
For K < K̂ we have Ly (Yi, Y
∗
F ) < Fy (Y
∗
F ;K) so ﬁrms engage in a war of attrition.
Under the assumption of Markov strategies,any randomization that occurs is over
investment triggers and it is with respect to these strategies that we derive the mixed
strategy equilibrium.14 There are two subcases to consider, i) K < K˜ and ii) K˜ ≤
K < K̂.
i) K < K˜ subcase
If K < K˜, we know from the characterization of Ly above that Ly (Yi, Y
∗
F ) has a
unique global maximum at YS and decreases over (YS ,∞). Any investment trigger
in [YL, YS) is thus dominated by investing at YS or later as a follower (see Figure 1).
The choice of investment triggers over [YS ,∞) constitutes a standard war of attrition
(see Hendricks et al. [19]), hence there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which
ﬁrms randomize investment triggers continuously over this latter interval. To derive
the unconditional (i.e. low initial y) equilibrium investment trigger distribution G0,
suppose that y ≤ YS and assume that ﬁrm j 6= i randomizes her investment trigger.
14Steg [32] derives a more general equilibrium in which ﬁrms choose stopping times. A key dif-
ference is that the mixed strategy equilibrium over investment triggers that we derive here does not
account explicitly for the fact that the process Yt exits the region over which attrition occurs with pos-
itive probability within any positive time increment. An equilibrium distribution over stopping times
does, and results in the same distribution of investment outcomes due to the relatively simple payoﬀ
structure in our model, in which the second-mover advantage is global, i.e. Ly
(
Y ;Y ∗F
) ≤ Fy (Y ∗F ;K)
when K ≤ K̂.
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Then ﬁrm i's expected payoﬀ from investing at Yi is
EyVy
(
Yi, Y˜j
)
=
∫ Yi
YS
Fy(s,K)gj(s;K)ds+My (Yi) (1−Gj(Yi;K)) (16)
where gj and Gj denote ﬁrm j's density and distribution. Firm i mixes over in-
vestment thresholds as well if ∂EVy
(
Yi, Y˜j
)
/∂Yi = 0 over (YS ,∞), so that the in
equilibrium, the hazard rate of investment triggers is
h0 (Yi;K) :=
g0 (Yi;K)
1−G0 (Yi;K) =
−M ′y(Yi)
Fy (Yi;K)−My(Yi) , (17)
the cumulative distribution being given by
G0 (Yi;K) = 1− exp
∫ Yi
YS
M ′y(s)
Fy (s;K)−My(s)ds, (18)
and resulting in an expected payoﬀ of My (YS). Substituting for Fy and My and
integrating gives the explicit form
G0 (Yi;K) = 1−
(
Yi
YS
)β II−K
exp
{
−β I
I −K
(
Yi
YS
− 1
)}
. (19)
ii) K˜ ≤ K < K̂ subcase
If K˜ ≤ K < K̂, we know from the characterization of Ly above that Ly (Yi, Y ∗F )
has a global maximum at YL and a local maximum at YS . Because the leader payoﬀ
Ly (Yi, Y
∗
F ) is not monotonic over [YL, YS ] the attrition game is nonstandard. Let YS′
denote the unique solution in [YL, YF ] to the condition Ly (YS′ , YF ) = My (YS). To
verify that this threshold is well-deﬁned, note that YL ≤ YF ≤ YS since Kl ≤ K˜ ≤
K < K̂ ≤ I and that Ly (Yi, Y ∗F ) is continuous and weakly decreasing on [YL, YF ] (see
Figure 2). In this case, the support of mixed strategies is (YL, YS′) ∪ (YS ,∞).
To derive the unconditional equilibrium distribution G (Yi;K) note ﬁrst that for
Yi ≥ YS , the expected payoﬀ of ﬁrm i has the same form as (16) above, so that the
hazard rate over [YS ,∞) is h0 (Yi;K). For YL ≤ Yi ≤ YS′ however, the expected
payoﬀ of ﬁrm i is
EyVy
(
Yi, Y˜j
)
= Fy (YF ;K)G (Yi) + Ly (Yi, YF ) (1−G(Yi)) . (20)
Diﬀerentiating and rearranging gives the hazard rate over [YL, YS′ ],
h (Yi;K) =
−∂Ly(Yi, YF )/∂Yi
Fy (YF ;K)− Ly(Yi, YF ) . (21)
The cumulative distribution over [YL, YS′ ] is therefore given by
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G (Yi;K) = 1− exp
∫ Yi
YL
∂Ly(s, YF )/∂s
Fy (YF ;K)− Ly(s, YF )ds (22)
=
Ly (YL, YF )− Ly (Yi, YF )
Fy (YF ;K)− Ly (Yi, YF ) . (23)
Substituting YS′ directly establishes the following intermediate result:
Proposition 13 For suﬃciently low y the probability of a positive lag between inno-
vation and imitation is15
G (YS′ ;K) =
(
(piM/piD)
β − 1
)
− β ((piM/piD)− 1) (I/K)β−1
(I/K)
β−1 − 1
. (24)
Together the cumulative distribution (22) over [YL, YS′ ] and the hazard rate h0 (Yi;K)
over [YS ,∞) deﬁne the equilibrium distribution as
G (Yi;K) =

G (Yi;K) if YL ≤ Yi ≤ YS′
G (YS′ ;K) if YS′ < Yi < YS
G (YS′ ;K) +
(
1−G (YS′ ;K)
)
G0 (Yi;K) if YS ≤ Yi
(25)
which results in an expected payoﬀ Ly (YL, Y
∗
F ).
Preemption equilibrium
For K > (resp. =)K̂, LYL (YL, Y
∗
F ) > (resp. =)FYL (Y
∗
F ;K) so there exists a
unique YP < YL (resp. YP = YL) such that LYP (YP , Y
∗
F ) = FYP (Y
∗
F ;K). We
refer to preemption when the inequalities are strict so YP < YL. Both ﬁrms seek to
invest at YP , with equal probability of being an innovator or of eﬀectively entering
as an imitator at YF . The structure of the game and the arguments establishing
equilibrium are those of a standard preemption game, although two additional points
warrant mention.
If K < I, the equilibrium condition Ly (Yi, Y
∗
F ) = Fy (Y
∗
F ;K) has a root YP ′ ∈
(YL, YF ). In this case, in contrast with standard preemption games. If the market
entry game were to start at Yt > YP ′ , ﬁrms would play a war of attrition resulting
in an expected payoﬀ Ly (Yt, Y
∗
F ). As ∂Ly (YP ′ , Y
∗
F ) /∂Yi < 0, if the game starts at a
low enough threshold (y ≤ YP ′) ﬁrms prefer to enter before YP ′ and this subgame is
never reached on the equilibrium path.
15Note that forK = K˜, YL = YS′ andG
(
YS′ ; K˜
)
= 0, whereas at the other extremeG
(
YS′ ; K̂
)
=
1.
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Second, although simultaneous investment is generally not an equilibrium in the
standard new market model of strategic investment, the suboptimality of simulta-
neous investment needs to be veriﬁed here because of the diﬀerence between leader
and follower investment costs. Investment at the optimal simultaneous investment
threshold YS results in a payoﬀ M (YS) and evaluating,
Ly (YL, Y
∗
F )
My (YS)
=
(
piM
piD
)β
− β
(
piM
piD
− 1
)(
I
K
)β−1
. (26)
This ratio is increasing in K and therefore over the preemption range for which
simultaneous equilibrium might arise, it is minimized at K̂. Substituting K̂ for K
and simplifying gives Ly (YL, Y
∗
F ) /My (YS) =
(
I/K̂
)(β−1)
≥ 1, with strict inequality
if piM > piD. The best response to Y−i = YS is thus YL for all K ≥ K̂. Therefore
ﬁrms seek to preempt one another before the simultaneous investment threshold is
reached. 
A.2 Proof of Corollary 3
To establish the corollary we characterize the eﬀect of β and piM/piD on K̂. Evaluating
the relevant partial derivatives and rearranging yields
∂K̂
∂ (piM/piD)
= −β
(
piM
piD
− 1
)(
1 + β
(
piM
piD
− 1
)) 2−β
β−1
(
piM
piD
) 1−2β
β−1
I (27)
so ∂K̂/∂ (piM/piD) < 0 directly,
16 whereas
∂K̂
∂β
=
−1
(β − 1)2
(
ln
1 + β ((piM/piD)− 1)
piM/piD
− (β − 1) ((piM/piD)− 1)
1 + β ((piM/piD)− 1)
)
K̂. (28)
The sign of ∂K̂/∂β < 0 is the opposite of that of the middle (bracketed) term.
Applying the logarithm inequality lnx > (x− 1) /x for x > 0, x 6= 1 with x =
(1 + β ((piM/piD)− 1)) / (piM/piD) yields
ln
1 + β ((piM/piD)− 1)
piM/piD
>
(β − 1) ((piM/piD)− 1)
1 + β ((piM/piD)− 1) (29)
which is suﬃcient to conclude. 
16Note that since K̂
∣∣∣
(piM/piD)=1
= I this establishes that K̂ ≤ I.
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A.3 Section 3.1 arguments and industry optimum (Proposi-
tion 4)
Sensitivity analysis of investment thresholds
Consider ﬁrst the innovation threshold YI (which takes values YL, or YP under
preemption, and min
{
Y˜1, Y˜2
}
under attrition). If K < K˜ (or K = K˜), the hazard
rate over ﬁrst entry thresholds implied by (17) is
h0 (Yi;K) =
βI
I −K
(
1
YS
− 1
Yi
)
, (30)
so ∂h/∂K ≥ 0. For K˜ < K < K̂, the hazard rate corresponding to (25) is deﬁned by
parts. Over [YL, YS′) the hazard rate is
h (Yi;K) =
−∂L(Yi, Y ∗F )/∂Yi
F (Y ∗F ;K)− L(Yi, Y ∗F )
(31)
where the numerator is independent ofK, so ∂h/∂K = − (∂ (F − L) /∂K) (∂L/∂Yi) / (F − L)2 ≥
0. Over [YS′ ,∞) we have ∂h/∂K = ∂h0/∂K ≥ 0. The hazard rate is discontinuous
at YS′ and YS , but as ∂YS′/∂K ≥ 0 and ∂YS/∂K = 0, it is increasing in K over the
entire range [YS ,∞). Finally, for K > K̂, YP decreases with K. Since the ﬁrst entry
threshold of each ﬁrm decreases with K, the minimum of these decreases as well. We
have therefore established:
Proposition 14 In an attrition regime, the hazard rate over innovator entry thresh-
olds increases with K for all K ≤ K̂.
With respect to imitator investment, in the attrition regime the second entry
threshold Y ∗F decreases stochastically with respect to K over (YF ,∞) where follower
entry is immediate, but increases deterministically otherwise. However, the expected
diﬀerence between the ﬁrst and second entry thresholds is monotone in K. For Kl ≤
K < K̂, Y ∗F − Y˜I = max
{
0, YF − Y˜I
}
is distributed over {0} ∪ [YF − YS′ , YF − YL]
as Pr {YF − Yi = 0} = G∧ (YS ;K) and (1−G∧ (YS ;K)) / (1−G∧ (YF − Yi;K)) oth-
erwise. So by Proposition 14 the diﬀerence between the second and the ﬁrst entry
threshold increases with K (stochastically in the attrition range and deterministically
in the preemption range).
Industry optimum
The proposition follows directly from the equilibrium values with rent equalization,
that is EV
(
Y˜1, Y˜2
)
= min {L (Y ∗L , Y ∗F ) , F (YF ;K)}, and the sensitivity of Land F to
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K. Note that for K ≤ K˜min {L (Y ∗L , Y ∗F ) , F (YF ;K)} = M(YS)is independent of K,
and that at K = K̂, M(YS) ≤ L (YL, Y ∗F ) = F
(
YF ; K̂
)
. Therefore, EV
(
Y˜1, Y˜2
)
is
constant over
[
0, K˜
)
, increasing over
(
K˜, K̂
)
, and decreasing over
(
K̂,∞
)
. 
A.4 Imitation cost, consumer surplus, and welfare (Proposi-
tion 5)
The argument is divided into four parts. We ﬁrst characterize the optimal imitation
cost level KP in the closure of the preemption regime (K ≥ K̂). Second, we establish
that K˜constitutes a lower bound for any optimal imitation cost in an attrition regime
(KA ≥ K˜). Third, we establish the existence of a local optimum of welfare under
attrition (K˜ ≤ KA < K̂). Finally we compare the optimum under preemption with
the optimal welfare that is attained in the attrition regime.
Socially optimal imitation cost in preemption regime
Suppose that K ≥ K̂, so entry thresholds are YP and YF . The social welfare
function (7) then has the form
W (K) =
(
piM + CSM
r − α YP − I
)(
Y0
YP
)β
+
(
(2piD + CSD)− (piM + CSM )
r − α YF −K
)(
Y0
YF
)β
.
(32)
Noting that YP and YF are functions of K with YP ≤ YL and limK→K̂ YP = YL, and
using the preemption equilibrium condition L (YP , YF ) = F (YF ;K) which implicitly
deﬁnes the ratio (YF /YP )
β
, the derivative of (32) can be expressed as
dW
dK
=
(
CSM
piM
(
β
piM
piD
YL
YL − YP − (β − 1)
YP
YL − YP
)
− βCSD
piD
− 2
)(
Y0
YF
)β
. (33)
If CSM = 0 the YL and YP terms in (33) vanish and it is straightforward to see that
dW/dK < 0, so that K̂ is a maximum. For CSM > 0, since limK→K̂ YP = YL (33)
satisﬁes limK→K̂ dW/dK = +∞, and is strictly decreasing in K over its range. So
long as limK→∞ dW/dK < 0, there is a unique root KP > K̂ that constitutes an
interior optimum which occurs if(
β2
piM
piD
− (β − 1)2
)
CSM
piM
− βCSD
piD
− 2 < 0. (34)
For notational simplicity, in what follows we let KP = ∞ if (34) does not hold.
Taken as a function of β the left-hand side of (34) is a quadratic function, ∆ (β), with
∆ (1) = (CSM − CSD − 2piD) /piD < 0 and lim∞∆ (β) =∞. Therefore there exists a
unique β0 > 1 such that ∆ (β0) = 0. Thus,
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Proposition 15 The constrained optimization problem maxK∈[K̂,∞]W (K) has a
unique optimum KP , and there exists a unique β0 > 1 such that KP is ﬁnite if
and only if β < β0.
For the proof of Proposition 7 in the next section it is also useful to derive the
optimal value of welfare that is realized in the preemption range. Several steps (see
Section A.8) establish that an optimum preemption threshold has the form Y ∗P = ψYL
where
ψ =

CSD−CSM
piD
+ 2β
CSD
piD
− β−1β
CSM
piM
+ 2β
, β < β0
β
β−1 , β ≥ β0
(35)
We have ψ ∈
[
β−1
β , 1
]
, and from (34) ψ = (β − 1) /β if β ≥ β0. Moreover, ψ = 1 if
CSM = 0. The optimal preemption threshold is Y
∗
P = ψYL, so Y
∗
P ∈ [YNPV, YL] where
YNPV := (r − α) I/piM is the myopic Marshallian investment trigger. The optimal
level of welfare under preemption can then be shown to be
WP (KP ) =
CSM
piM
ψ1−β
1− ψ
I
β − 1
(
Y0
YL
)β
. (36)
Lower bound on socially optimal imitation cost
If K < K˜ (ﬁrst attrition subcase in Section A.1 above) so ﬁrms randomize invest-
ment triggers over [YS ,∞) according to the distribution G0 (Yi;K) and imitator entry
is immediate, then W (K) < W
(
K̂
)
. To see this, note ﬁrst that by Proposition 4,
industry value is lower at K than at K̂, so it suﬃces to show that expected consumer
surplus is lower also. But at K̂, innovator and imitator entry occur at the standalone
thresholds YL and ŶF :=
(
β (r − α) K̂
)
/ ((β − 1)piD), whereas the lower bound of the
entry threshold distribution under attrition is YS = (β (r − α) I) / ((β − 1)piD) ≥ ŶF .
Therefore, both investments occur later if K < K˜ than they do at the critical imita-
tion cost K̂ resulting in lower consumer surplus and hence in lower welfare.
Existence of local maximum in attrition regime
Consider the value of W (K) just to the left of K̂. Since V
(
Y˜1, Y˜2
)
is maximized
at K̂, at this critical value the sign of limK→K̂− dW (K) /dK depends only on the
behavior of the consumer surplus terms. For simplicity consider the third term,
consumer surplus from imitation (the argument for the other term is similar). As
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noted in the text the consumer surplus from imitation is given by
CSD − CSM
r − α [YF ]
−(β−1)
Y β0
 G∧ (YS′ ;K)︸ ︷︷ ︸
lagged imitator entry
+
∫ ∞
YS
(YF /s)
β−1
dG∧(s;K)︸ ︷︷ ︸

immediate imitator entry
. (37)
To determine the value of the left derivative at K̂ of (37) recall that the distribution
of entry thresholds is given by G∧ (Yi;K) = 1 − (1−G (Yi;K))2. Consider the ﬁrst
summand in (37). Since G
(
YS′ ; K̂
)
= 1, G∧
(
YS′ ; K̂
)
= 1. Moreover ∂G∧/∂s =
2 (1−G) (∂G/∂s) so ∂G∧ (YS′ ;K) /∂K|K̂ = 0. Therefore in (37) only the direct
eﬀect of K on YF matters for welfare at K̂. A similar argument applies to the
consumer surplus from innovation term in (7), except that there is no direct eﬀect
since YL is independent of K.
Therefore,
lim
K→K̂−
dEW (K)
dK
= − (β − 1) CSD − CSM
r − α Y
−β
F Y
β
0
∂YF
∂K
≤ 0. (38)
Since W (K) is continuous, we conclude that if CSD > CSM , there exists a local
optimum imitation cost level KA in
(
K˜, K̂
)
.
Global welfare optimum
We therefore know that for CSD > CSM , limK→K̂− dW (K) /dK < 0 and that for
CSM > 0, limK→K̂+ dW (K) /dK > 0, so that for (CSD − CSM ) CSM > 0, welfare
has local maxima in both the (upper) attrition and preemption ranges, whereas the
local maximum under preemption isKP = K̂ if CSM = 0 andKA = K̂ under attrition
if CSD = CSM . Either type of local maximum can be a global maximum depending
on the relative magnitude of the consumer surplus resulting from innovation and
imitation. 
A.5 Imitation cost, consumer surplus, and welfare con't (Propo-
sition 7)
To establish the result, an upper bound is ﬁrst derived for the level of welfare realized
in the attrition regime and then compared with a lower bound of the welfare obtained
under preemption. These bounds are tight only in the limit (β = 1), but have the
advantage of resulting in a tractable analytic condition (see (48) below).
Upper bound for welfare under attrition
The optimal value of expected welfare under attrition can be bounded above as
follows. Given the innovation threshold min
{
Y˜1, Y˜2
}
let Y˜F = Y
∗
F
(
min
{
Y˜1, Y˜2
}
;K
)
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denote the (stochastic) imitation threshold for a given imitation costK. The expected
social welfare under attrition (7) is
WA (K) = E
(
CSM + piM
r − α min
{
Y˜1, Y˜2
}
− I
) Y0
min
{
Y˜1, Y˜2
}
β
+ E
(
(CSD + 2piD)− (CSM + piM )
r − α Y˜F −K
)(
Y0
Y˜F
)β
. (39)
To bound the ﬁrst term, note that its integrand is quasiconcave in the initial in-
vestment threshold and min
{
Y˜1, Y˜2
}
≥ YL ≥ (β (r − α) I) /((β − 1)(CSM + piM ))
where the rightmost term is the global maximizer. The ﬁrst integrand in (39) is thus
decreasing in investment threshold over the relevant range so
E
(
CSM + piM
r − α min
{
Y˜1, Y˜2
}
− I
) Y0
min
{
Y˜1, Y˜2
}
β
≤
(
CSM + piM
r − α YL − I
)(
Y0
YL
)β
=
(
β
CSM
piM
+ 1
)
I
β − 1
(
Y0
YL
)β
. (40)
For the second term in (39), using the assumption that the static entry incentive is
excessive,
E
(
(CSD + 2piD)− (CSM + piM )
r − α Y˜F −K
)(
Y0
Y˜F
)β
≤ E
(
piD
r − αY˜F −K
)(
Y0
Y˜F
)β
.
(41)
The term on the right-hand side is simply the expected follower payoﬀ in equilib-
rium, that is EF
(
Y ∗F
(
Y˜−i;K
)
;K
)
= EV
(
Y˜1, Y˜2
)
. Moreover, by Proposition 4,
EV
(
Y˜1, Y˜2
)
is maximized for K = K̂. Therefore (41) holds if
E
(
(CSD + 2piD)− (CSM + piM )
r − α Y˜F −K
)(
Y0
Y˜F
)β
≤ K̂
β − 1
(
Y0
ŶF
)β
. (42)
Then note that ŶF =
(
K̂/I
)
(piM/piD)YL and substitute for
(
K̂/I
)1−β
(using (13))
to obtain the equivalent condition
E
(
(CSD + 2piD)− (CSM + piM )
r − α Y˜F −K
)(
Y0
Y˜F
)β
≤ 1
1 + β
(
piM
piD
− 1
) I
β − 1
(
Y0
YL
)β
.
(43)
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Combining (40) and (43) yields the upper bound
WA (K) ≤
βCSM
piM
+ 1 +
1
1 + β
(
piM
piD
− 1
)
 I
β − 1
(
Y0
YL
)β
. (44)
Suﬃcient condition for preemption optimum to be global
The optimal value of expected welfare under preemption is WP (KP ) (see Section
A.8 for derivation and equation (36)):
WP (KP ) =
CSM
piM
ψ1−β
1− ψ
I
β − 1
(
Y0
YL
)β
. (45)
It is straightforward to check that taken as a function of ψ over (0, 1), ψ1−β/ (1− ψ)
is strictly convex and minimized at ψ0 := (β − 1) /β. Substituting ψ0 for ψ in (45)
and simplifying thus yields
WP (∞) = CSM
piM
I
(
β
β − 1
)β (
Y0
YL
)β
≤WP (KP ) . (46)
Therefore, a suﬃcient condition for the preemption optimum to be a global opti-
mum of welfare is WA (K) ≤ WP (∞). Combining (44) and (46) and simplifying the
common (I/ (β − 1)) (Y0/YL)β terms yields the condition
β
CSM
piM
+ 1 +
1
1 + β
(
piM
piD
− 1
) ≤ βCSM
piM
(
β
β − 1
)β−1
. (47)
Rearranging and using 1/ (1 + β((piM/piD)− 1)) ≤ 1, a suﬃcient condition for (47)
to hold is
CSM
piM
≥ 2
β
1(
β
β−1
)β−1
− 1
=: Ω (β) . (48)
To characterize the right-hand side of (48), note ﬁrst that using l'Hôpital's rule,
lim1
(
β
β−1
)β−1
= 1 and lim∞
(
β
β−1
)β−1
= e, so Ω (1) = ∞ and lim∞ Ω (β) = 0.
Moreover, 2/β is decreasing and d
(
β
β−1
)β−1
/dβ =
(
β
β−1
)β−1 (
− 1β + ln ββ−1
)
which
is positive since ln (β/ (β − 1)) > 1/β by the logarithm inequality, so Ω (β) is decreas-
ing over this range. 
A.6 Endogenous entry barrier
In stage 3', the imitator payoﬀ depends on the cost-raising eﬀort ρ:
F (Yi;K) =
(
piD
r − αYi −K0 − f (ρ)
)(
Y0
Yi
)β
. (49)
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The optimal standalone imitator threshold is YF (ρ) = β (r − α) (K0 + f (ρ)) / ((β − 1)piD),
yielding an optimal choice Y ∗F (ρ) = max {Yi, YF (ρ)}. In stage 2', an innovator having
entered at the threshold Yi chooses a level of eﬀort that maximizes:
Le (Yi, ρ) =
(
piM
r − αYi − I0 − ρ
)
+
piD − piM
r − α Y
∗
F (ρ)
(
Yi
Y ∗F (ρ)
)β
. (50)
Note that the term Y ∗F (ρ) generally introduces a kink in the innovator's stage 2'
payoﬀ. For example with K0 ≤ ((β − 1) /β) (piD/piM ) I0, YF (0) ≤ YNPV so that
Y ∗F (ρ) = Yi both in attrition and preemption regimes for some range of eﬀort ρ ∈
[0, ρ]. In such cases the innovator's stage 2' decision problem may present a corner
solution. Moreover in an attrition regime, since the innovator threshold is random, the
optimal endogenous entry barrier is itself a random variable in stage 1'. However, to
determine the critical imitation cost K̂e that separates the two regimes, it is suﬃcient
to consider the case in which innovator entry occurs at the threshold at which there
are no positional rents, i.e. YL,e (ρ
∗) = β (r − α) (I0 + ρ∗) / ((β − 1)piM ) where ρ∗
solves maxρ Le (YL,e, ρ) such that Le (YL,e, ρ
∗) = F
(
YF ; K̂e
)
. Since at K = K̂,(
Yt
YL,e(ρ∗)
)β
Le (YL,e (ρ
∗) , ρ∗) ≥
(
Yt
YL
)β
Le (YL,e (0) , 0) = L (YL, YF ) = F
(
YF ; K̂
)
, it
immediately follows that K̂e = K0 + f (ρ
∗) ≤ K̂. 
A.7 Buyout and licensing
Depending on the eﬀect of entry on industry proﬁt, there are two cases to consider.
Case i: eﬃciency eﬀect (piM/piD ≥ 2)
Suppose that the innovator, at the time of investment, can oﬀer a payment of ϕ
to buy its rival's option on duopoly proﬁts. The innovator's decision in stage 2 in
this case is maxϕ≥F0(Yi) Lb (Yi, ϕ) where
Lb (Yi, ϕ) :=
(
piM
r − αYi − I − ϕ
)(
Y0
Yi
)β
(51)
and ϕ ≥ F0(Yi) is the rival ﬁrm's participation constraint. As imitator entry reduces
industry ﬂow proﬁt, a takeover is always eﬃcient for the ﬁrms and it is straightforward
to verify that at an optimum Lb (Yi, F0(Yi)) > L (Yi, Y
∗
F ).
To establish that a buyout can increase welfare, consider the case where imitator
entry would leave the consumer surplus unchanged, as occurs if 2piD = piM (i.e., a
unit demand or a cartel in a homogeneous product market). If K ≥ K̂, preemption
occurs, and industry value is pegged to F0(Yt) regardless of whether takeovers are
allowed or not. A buyout is eﬃcient in this case if the ﬁrst ﬁrm enters earlier. This
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occurs when the innovator can make a purchase oﬀer to its rival, i.e. if the lower root
of Lb (Yi, F0(Yi)) = F (YF ;K) is lower than YP , which holds since Lb (Yi, F0(Yi)) >
L (Yi, Y
∗
F ).
To establish that attrition can be eliminated, consider the limiting case K = 0.
In this case, follower entry is immediate for all Yi, so F0(Yi) = piDYi/ (r − α) and the
stage 1 leader payoﬀ is therefore
Lb (Yi, F0(Yi)) :=
(
piM − piD
r − α Yi − I
)(
Y0
Yi
)β
. (52)
Let Yb := β (r − α) I/ ((β − 1) (piM − piD)) denote the maximizer of the latter func-
tion. Solving Lb(Yb, F0(Yb)) ≥ F0(Yb)(Yt/Yb)β gives the condition under which pre-
emption arises even with a maximal second mover advantage (K = 0) as piM/piD ≥
β + 1.
If a buyout is not possible then the innovator may license its technology to
the imitator when it enters. The innovator's decision in stage 2 takes the form
maxϕ≤KI Vl (ϕ) where
Vl (ϕ) =
(
piM − piD
r − α Y
∗
F (ϕ)− ϕ
)(
Y0
Y ∗F (ϕ)
)β
(53)
and the rival's participation constraint is F (Y ∗F ;K0 + ϕ) ≥ F0(Y ∗F ). In (53), Y ∗F (ϕ)
is the follower's investment threshold is generally a function of the fee ϕ (if ϕ < KI),
although at an optimum ϕ∗ = KI and Y ∗F (ϕ) = Y
∗
F . In stage 1 then, the leader value
is
Ll (Yi, Y
∗
F ) :=
(
piM
r − αYi − I
)(
Y0
Yi
)β
+
(
piD − piM
r − α Y
∗
F +KI
)(
Y0
Y ∗F
)β
(54)
so licensing simply has a level eﬀect on the leader payoﬀ if Yi < YF . Setting
Ll (YL, YF ) = F (YF ;K) deﬁnes the critical threshold K̂l < K̂ that separates the at-
trition and preemption regimes. To establish the eﬀect of licensing on welfare, there
are three cases to consider: 1) If K ≥ K̂, the industry is preemptive whether licens-
ing occurs or not. Industry value and the timing of imitation are then unaﬀected by
licensing, whereas the preemption threshold decreases since Ll (Yi, Y
∗
F ) > L (Yi, Y
∗
F )
so innovation occurs earlier and welfare increases. 2) Alternatively, if K ∈
(
K̂l, K̂
)
,
then the industry switches from an attrition regime to preemption when licensing is
allowed. As compared with the previous case, the increase in welfare is also due to an
increase in industry value and earlier imitation. 3) Finally, if K ≤ K̂l, the industry
is in an attrition regime whether licensing occurs or not. Industry value is pegged on
the optimal leader value, which increases in comparison to the baseline model, and
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the imitation is either unaﬀected (if Y˜I ≤ YF ) or occurs earlier if innovation occurs
earlier. What remains to be veriﬁed is that the distribution of innovation thresholds
shifts left with licensing. We do this in the case that K is not too small, K˜l < K ≤ K̂l,
(the argument for K ≤ K˜l is similar).
Note ﬁrst that the support of the mixed strategy distribution, [YL, YS′,l]∪[YS,l,∞),
is larger with licensing. YL is unaﬀected by licensing, whereas YS,l = β (r − α) (I −KI) / ((β − 1)piD) <
YS . Finally, for Yi < YF licensing shifts L (Yi, YF ) upward by KI (Yt/YF )
β
, which is
weakly larger than the upward shifts of M (Yi) (KI (Yt/Yi)
β
), so YS′,l > YS′ (see the
graphic construction of YS′ in Figure 2 ).
Next, it is necessary to examine the impact of licensing on the hazard rate of Y˜I .
Over [YS ,∞), the hazard rate implied by (18), adapted to the licensing speciﬁcation,
becomes
h0,l (Yi;K0 + ϕ
∗) = β
I −KI
I −KI −K
(
1
YS,l
− 1
Yi
)
. (55)
Comparing with h0 in (30), we ﬁnd
h0,l (Yi;K0 + ϕ
∗)
h0 (Yi;K)
=
(I −KI) (I −K)
I (I −KI −K)
1
YS,l
− 1Yi
1
YS
− 1Yi
> 1. (56)
Over [YL, YS′), the hazard rate implied by (22), adapted to licensing, becomes
hl (Yi;K0) =
−∂Ll(Yi)/∂Yi
F (Y ∗F ;K)− Ll(Yi)
(57)
and since the slope of Ll is independent of ϕ so that licensing only has a positive level
eﬀect, hl (Yi;K0) > h (Yi;K).
Case ii: product market complementarity (piM/piD < 2)
If the second ﬁrm's entry increases industry proﬁt, there is an optimal imitator
entry threshold for the industry Y ∗∗F := β (r − α)K0/ (β − 1) (2piD − piM ), which may
be either greater or smaller than YF as noted in the text. With a simple ﬂat license fee
instrument an innovator cannot induce imitation beyond YF (it could with a forcing
contract or a combination of a ﬂat fee and a royalty payment but we do not pursue
this further here) so the most interesting case to consider is if imitation occurs too late
from an industry standpoint and the innovator has some leeway regarding imitator
entry i.e. Yi, Y
∗∗
F < YF . (Otherwise, the optimal license fee is KI , imitation occurs
at Y ∗F , and the outcome is comparable to the previous case.) If these inequalities do
hold, then in stage 2, the innovator's problem is maxϕ≤KI Vl (ϕ) where
Vl (ϕ) =
(
ϕ− piM − piD
r − α Y
∗∗
F
)(
Y0
Y ∗∗F
)β
(58)
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and the follower's participation constraint is F (Y ∗∗F ;K0 + ϕ) ≥ F0(Y ∗∗F ). An optimal
license fee satisﬁes this constraint with equality, i.e. at the optimal imitation threshold
Y ∗∗F ,
piD
r − αY
∗∗
F −K0 − ϕ∗ =
(
piD
r − αYF −K0 −KI
)(
Y ∗∗F
YF
)β
(59)
whereas if ϕ = KI , as Y
∗∗
F < YF and since YF is a maximizer,
piD
r − αY
∗∗
F −K0 − ϕ <
(
piD
r − αYF −K0 −KI
)(
Y ∗∗F
YF
)β
so ϕ∗ < KI . 
A.8 Additional derivations
This section details some of the intermediate steps and lengthier derivations referred
to above.
A.8.1 Derivation of K̂, K˜, and Kl ≤ K˜ ≤ K̂ ranking
To ﬁnd K̂, set LYL (YL, YF ) = FYL
(
YF ; K̂
)
i.e.
(
piM
r − αYL − I
)(
Yt
YL
)β
+
piD − piM
r − α YF
(
Yt
YF
)β
=
(
piD
r − αYF − K̂
)(
Yt
YF
)β
(60)
or, substituting for YL and ŶF = β (r − α) K̂/ (β − 1)piD (at K = K̂)
I
β − 1
(
Yt
YL
)β
+
β
β − 1
(
1− piM
piD
)
K̂
(
Yt
ŶF
)β
=
K̂
β − 1
(
Yt
ŶF
)β
. (61)
Then multiply by
(
ŶF /Yt
)β
and note that ŶF /YL = (piM/piD)
(
K̂/I
)
to get
I
β − 1
(
piM
piD
)β (
K̂
I
)β
+
β
β − 1
(
1− piM
piD
)
K̂ =
K̂
β − 1 . (62)
Multiplying by (β − 1) /K̂ and regrouping terms,
(
piM
piD
)β (
K̂
I
)β−1
= 1 + β
(
piM
piD
− 1
)
(63)
so
K̂ =
(
(1 + β ((piM/piD)− 1)) / (piM/piD)β
)1/(β−1)
I. (64)
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To ﬁnd K˜, set LYL (YL, YF ) = MYL (YS) i.e.(
piM
r − αYL − I
)(
Yt
YL
)β
+
piD − piM
r − α YF
(
Yt
YF
)β
=
(
piD
r − αYS − I
)(
Yt
YS
)β
. (65)
Substituting for YL, YF , and YS gives
I
β − 1
(
Yt
YL
)β
+
β
β − 1
(
1− piM
piD
)
K˜
(
Yt
YF
)β
=
I
β − 1
(
Yt
YS
)β
. (66)
Multiply by (YF /Yt)
β
and note that YF /YL = (piM/piD)
(
K˜/I
)
and YF /YS = K˜/I
to get
I
β − 1
(
piM
piD
)β (
K˜
I
)β
+
β
β − 1
(
1− piM
piD
)
K˜ =
I
β − 1
(
K˜
I
)β
. (67)
Regrouping terms on either side,
I
β − 1
((
piM
piD
)β
− 1
)(
K˜
I
)β
=
β
β − 1
(
piM
piD
− 1
)
K˜ (68)
and multiplying by (β − 1) /K˜,((
piM
piD
)β
− 1
)(
K˜
I
)β−1
= β
(
piM
piD
− 1
)
(69)
so
K˜ =
(
β ((piM/piD)− 1) /
(
(piM/piD)
β − 1
))1/(β−1)
I. (70)
The diﬀerent critical imitation cost levels are ranked as Kl ≤ K˜ ≤ K̂, with strict
inequalities if piM > piD. Indeed, straightforward calculations show that K˜ ≥ Kl if
and only if
(β − 1) (piM/piD)β − β (piM/piD)β−1 + 1 ≥ 0, (71)
and that K̂ ≥ K˜ if and only if
(piM/piD)
β − β ((piM/piD)− 1)− 1 ≥ 0. (72)
Both of these conditions hold for all β, piM/piD ≥ 1 (it suﬃces to evaluate them
at piM/piD = 1 and to observe that the derivative with respect to piM/piD is non-
negative).
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A.8.2 Welfare under preemption
Characterization of YP (K)
Over
(
K̂,∞
)
the condition L (YP , YF ) = F (YF ;K) implicitly deﬁnes the preemp-
tion threshold YP as a C1 function of K (see Section A.1):(
piM
r − αYP − I
)(
Y0
YP
)β
+
piD − piM
r − α YF
(
Y0
YF
)β
=
(
piD
r − αYF −K
)(
Y0
YF
)β
. (73)
Dividing by Y0 and moving YF terms to the right-hand side gives(
piM
r − αYP − I
)
Y −βP =
(
piM
r − αYF −K
)
Y −βF (74)
or, substituting (β (r − α)K) / ((β − 1)piD) for YF and factoring K1−β ,(
piM
r − αYP − I
)
Y −βP =
(
β
β − 1
piM
piD
− 1
)(
β
β − 1
r − α
piD
)−β
K1−β . (75)
The condition (75) has the form f (YP ) = g (K) and thus deﬁnes dYP /dK = g
′(K)/f ′(YP )
where
f ′ (YP ) =
(
− (β − 1) piM
r − αYP + βI
)
Y −β−1P (76)
and
g′ (K) = − (β − 1)
(
β
β − 1
piM
piD
− 1
)(
β
β − 1
r − α
piD
)−β
K−β = −β − 1
K
g (K) . (77)
The sign g′ (K) < 0 is direct whereas for any preemption threshold YP , YP < YL,
and therefore f ′ (YP ) > 0. Finally note that from (76) and (77), using the identity
f (YP ) = g(K) and simplifying the numerator and the denominator by Y
−β
P ,
dYP
dK
= −β − 1
K
piM
r−αYP − I
− (β − 1) piMr−α + β (I/YP )
. (78)
Interior preemption optimum KP
Suppose that condition (34) holds so that the preemption optimum is interior. In
a preemption equilibrium innovator and imitator entry occur at YP and YF so social
welfare is
W (K) =
(
CSM + piM
r − α YP − I
)(
Y0
YP
)β
+
(
(CSD + 2piD)− (CSM + piM )
r − α YF −K
)(
Y0
YF
)β
.
(79)
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Substituting for YF in the second term and factoring K,
W (K) =
(
CSM + piM
r − α YP − I
)(
Y0
YP
)β
+
(
β
β − 1
(CSD + 2piD)− (CSM + piM )
piD
− 1
)(
β
β − 1
r − α
piD
)−β
Y β0 K
1−β . (80)
In a constrained social optimum the planner's problem over the preemption range is
maxK≥K̂W (K). The derivative of (80) is
W ′ (K) =
(
− (β − 1) CSM + piM
r − α YP + βI
)(
Y0
YP
)β
1
YP
dYP
dK
− (β − 1)
(
β
β − 1
(CSD + 2piD)− (CSM + piM )
piD
− 1
)(
β
β − 1
r − α
piD
)−β
Y β0 K
−β .
At an interior optimum the socially optimal imitation cost KP satisﬁes the ﬁrst-
order condition W ′P (KP ) = 0, but it is more convenient to obtain an expression
for the corresponding socially optimal preemption threshold Y ∗P from the ﬁrst-order
condition. Substituting for dYP /dK (expression (78)) in the ﬁrst-order condition and
multiplying by K/ ((β − 1)Y0) gives
−
(
− (β − 1) CSM+piMr−α Y ∗P + βI
)(
piM
r−αY
∗
P − I
)
− (β − 1) piMr−αY ∗P + βI
Y ∗−βP
−
(
β
β − 1
(CSD + 2piD)− (CSM + piM )
piD
− 1
)(
β
β − 1
r − α
piD
)−β
K∗1−β = 0. (82)
From the preemption condition (75),(
β
β − 1
r − α
piD
)−β
K1−β =
(
piM
r−αY
∗
P − I
)
Y ∗−βP
β
β−1
piM
piD
− 1 . (83)
Substituting into the second term in (82), cancelling
(
piM
r−αY
∗
P − I
)
Y ∗−βP terms which
appear in both parts, and rearranging yields an equivalent condition in terms of Y ∗P
only,
(β − 1) CSM+piMr−α Y ∗P − βI
− (β − 1) piMr−αY ∗P + βI
=
β
β−1
(CSD+2piD)−(CSM+piM )
piD
− 1
β
β−1
piM
piD
− 1 . (84)
There is a unique solution to (84) which can be expressed as Y ∗P = ψYL = ψ (β (r − α) I) / ((β − 1)piM ),
in which case the numerator and denominator of the left hand side simplify yielding,
after rearrangement of the right-hand side also,
CSM+piM
piM
ψ − 1
1− ψ =
(CSD+2piD)−(CSM+piM )
piD
− β−1β
piM
piD
− β−1β
(85)
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and it is straightforward to check that the unique solution is
ψ =
CSD−CSM
piD
+ 2β
CSD
piD
− β−1β CSMpiM + 2β
. (86)
Note that setting Y ∗P > YNPV is equivalent to setting ψ > (β − 1) /β and yields
condition (34) in the text.
It is now possible to return to the social welfare expression (80) and obtain an
explicit form for the value of social welfare at the optimum. First, the identity (83)
can be used to substitute terms in the second summand of W (KP ) so as to obtain
an expression in terms of Y ∗P only,
WP (Y
∗
P ) =
(
CSM + piM
r − α Y
∗
P − I
)(
Y0
Y ∗P
)β
+
(
β
β − 1
(CSD + 2piD)− (CSM + piM )
piD
− 1
) piM
r−αY
∗
P − I
β
β−1
piM
piD
− 1
(
Y0
Y ∗P
)β
. (87)
Regrouping terms
WP (Y
∗
P ) =
(
CSM+piM
r−α Y
∗
P − I
)(
β
β−1
piM
piD
− 1
)
β
β−1
piM
piD
− 1
(
Y0
Y ∗P
)β
(88)
+
(
β
β−1
(CSD+2piD)−(CSM+piM )
piD
− 1
)(
piM
r−αY
∗
P − I
)
β
β−1
piM
piD
− 1
(
Y0
Y ∗P
)β
. (89)
Substituting for Y ∗P = (β (r − α)ψI) / ((β − 1)piM ) (= ψYL) and factoring I,
WP (Y
∗
P ) =
(
β
β−1
CSM+piM
piM
ψ − 1
)(
β
β−1
piM
piD
− 1
)
β
β−1
piM
piD
− 1
+
(
β
β−1
(CSD+2piD)−(CSM+piM )
piD
− 1
)(
β
β−1ψ − 1
)
β
β−1
piM
piD
− 1 ψ
−βI
(
Y0
YL
)β
. (90)
It is straightforward to check that after substituting the expression for ψ given by
(86) and some algebra,
WP (Y
∗
P ) =
CSM
piM
ψ1−β
1− ψ
I
β − 1
(
Y0
YL
)β
. (91)

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